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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT:
LESSONS FROM THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE
RIcHARD B. STEWART*
This Article has two objectives. First, the Article will develop a con-
ceptual framework for analyzing the interrelationship between trade res-
traints and environmental protection policy. Second, it will draw from the
experiences of two federal-type political systems-the United States and the
European Community-potential lessons for the international institutional
treatment of trade and environment issues. The Article does not deal with
many other aspects of trade and environment issues, such as the use of
pollution-control subsidies, or the impact of trade liberalization on environ-
mental quality, or whether treaty negotiations should be subject to environ-
mental assessment procedures. Nor does it offer a detailed review of relevant
legal texts and decisions. Its aim is to provide an analytical structure for
thinking through the issues of law and policy presented by trade-related
environmental regulation.
I. THE FREE TRADE REGIME
The cornerstone of the case for free trade is the mutual economic
benefit resulting from trade among nations with differences in comparative
advantage in producing goods and services. This concept has been charac-
terized by Paul Samuelson as "the sole proposition in the Social Sciences
which is both true and non-trivial."' In the classic Ricardian conception,
comparative advantage was based on relative differences in factor endow-
ments-such as the character of agricultural land, climate, timber, and
mineral resources-among nations.2 But an enlarged conception of compar-
ative advantage has come to include differences in human capital and
industrial and technological infrastructure. No reason exists in principle why
comparative advantage should not also encompass differences in national
economic, social, and regulatory policies and legal and administrative sys-
tems. Economists also regard national differences in the ability of ecosystems
and populations to assimilate pollution as an element of comparative ad-
vantage.'
* Professor of Law, New York University; Counsel, Sidley & Austin. The research
assistance of Evan Van Hook and the helpful comments of Tom McMahon are gratefully
acknowledged.
1. David Robertson, Trade and the Environment: Harmonization and Technical Stan-
dards, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 309, 311 n.6 (Patrick Low ed., 1992).
2. DAVw RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POITrICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATiON 113-17 (London,
George Bell & Sons 1891).
3. For example, a nation like Britain with relatively short, fast-running rivers will
experience less damage from water pollution than Germany or France. Likewise, a sparsely
populated nation can locate industrial facilities so as to suffer less pollution-related illness than
a small, densely populated nation.
1329
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1329
There are additional reasons, beyond comparative advantage, why free
trade should enhance the welfare of all nations engaging in trade.4 A wider
market enhances the opportunity to realize economies of scale. It also
promotes specialization, with attendant gains in productivity. A greater
array of suppliers stiffens the efficiency-promoting discipline of competition.
The wider network of international contacts accelerates the diffusion of
knowledge and technological innovation.
5
Experience confirms the economic benefits of a free trade regime (FTR).
Empirical studies show a strong correlation between the degree of trade
liberalization and economic growth rates among different nations and a
similar correlation between changes in trade policy and growth in individual
nations .
6
The economic benefits from a common market and the perceived
detriments from trade rivalry among the states under the Articles of Con-
federation were an important impetus for the ratification and adoption of
the United States Constitution. 7 The expected gains from the creation of a
common market and common currency were not purely economic; it was
thought that economic integration would advance political integration and
mutual security. Similar considerations propelled the creation and subsequent
strengthening of the European Community. Economic rivalry was thought
to stimulate political conflict and to have contributed to the outbreak of
three large-scale wars in Europe within seventy-five years. Europeans be-
lieved that economic integration would ameliorate the causes of political
and military conflict.
Economic integration was seen as a global imperative after World War
II. Many western leaders thought that restrictive trade policies by major
nations in response to the Great Depression were a major cause of the
continued economic stagnation of the 1930s. The development of a coor-
dinated international monetary policy at Bretton Woods and the promotion
of trade liberalization through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)' were cornerstones of global prosperity. The post-war creation of
a global FTR was a major factor behind the spectacular growth of the
global economy in the following three decades. 9 The founders of the post-
war economic order also had political and security objectives, believing that
economic interdependence would reduce political and military conflict.
Given the benefits of free trade, why should nations ever seek to impose
barriers to it? In most cases, restrictions are imposed to protect the interests
4. This paragraph and the four following draw heavily on Rdetzki, Economic Growth
and Environment, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 121.
5. ANNE 0. KRUEGER, PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 57-62 (1990); Anne
0. Krueger, Trade Policy as an Input to Development, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 288 (1980).
6. See KRUEGER, supra note 5, at 212.
7. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEw NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING
THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-89 (1950).
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
9. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988).
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of producers and workers who would be injured by greater competition. In
many of these cases, however, a nation's consumers would suffer greater
losses in welfare from trade barriers than the benefits that these barriers
afford to producer interests. Trade barriers, in most cases, reflect superior
organizational strength and political power on the part of producer interests
over consumer interests. The benefits provided to consumers are by import
competition not salient. By contrast, the social costs and dislocations from
import competition often take dramatic form-plant closings and job losses.
The benefits provided to consumers are less salient. The fact that these
losses are inflicted by foreign producers and can be blunted by trade
restrictions aimed exclusively at them provides a stronger political rallying
point for competition-restraining measures than in the case of dislocations
caused by domestic competition.
Trade barriers may also reflect a demand for national autonomy in
social and economic policy. Sentiment exists that a political community
should be able to set its own priorities and principles, rather than have
them dictated by remote economic forces. Some states with centrally-planned
economies have adopted trade restrictions for fear that a FTR would disrupt
their ability to carry out central planning. A related concern is that if
political integration follows economic integration, a nation's political au-
tonomy will be further compromised. These concerns were shared by the
Anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of the United States Constitution 0
and by the Danish voters who opposed Danish participation in a post-
Maastricht European Community." This concern for polick independence
has become especially prominent in the environmental context, as nations
have sought increasingly to impose restrictions on trade in the name of
health, safety and ecological protection.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: TiE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE
This section addresses the different types of externalities or spillovers
that environmental problems can create in a system of distinct states or
nations that are economically integrated through a common market. Those
problems have been addressed in two federal-type systems with different
forms of political integration-the United States and the European Com-
munity.
An important methodological point must first be addressed. The analytic
and institutional interrelations between trade policy and environmental pro-
tection policy, and the institutional response to those interrelations, can be
better understood if both types of measures are regarded as aimed at
10. See Ralph Ketcham, Introduction to THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CON-
sTnUTIoNAL DEBATES 17 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981).
11. See To Be or Not to Be E.C.; The Danes Reject the European Treaty and All Hell
Breaks Loose, TimE, June 15, 1992, at 22.
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promoting human welfare, broadly understood. I envision a conception of
human welfare akin to that of John Stuart Mill, which goes beyond the
maximization of existing preferences to include qualities of diversity, edu-
cation, aspiration, reflection, -and solidarity.' 2 This conception rejects the
position that environmental protection is an autonomous moral duty-an
independent absolute. If this were so, trade policy would either be reduced
to a mere means for carrying out this duty, or would also rest on some
other independent duty, such as furthering human welfare, that would then
have to be reconciled somehow with the duty of environmental protection.
Many environmentalists believe that there is a duty of environmental pro-
tection. But that view is not shared by the majority, particularly in the
global context. It thus seems appropriate, for the present, to proceed on
the premise that environmental protection policy as well as trade policy are
both appropriately aimed at promoting, in different ways, human welfare,
broadly understood.
Under standard welfare economic reasoning, environmental problems
arise because production and consumption activities result in adverse effects
on others, which are not reflected in market transactions. Because of such
externalities or spillovers, producers and consumers cause excessive amounts
of pollution and other forms of environmental degradation. The potential
responses to this problem include improved private legal remedies for those
adversely affected, government regulation, and pollution taxes or other
economic incentives. Such measures should be designed to reduce spillovers
to the point where the costs and other burdens of additional reductions
exceeds the social benefits.
The analogous problem of environmental policy in a system of separate
states or nations is that environmental practices by one state can diminish,
through externalities or spillovers, the welfare of those in other jurisdictions.
In order to analyze the problems that such externalities cause and the
possible means of dealing with them, it is essential to distinguish several
different types of externalities. One set of spillovers is created by trade in
products and product regulation. A second set is generated by trade in and
regulation of natural resources. A third set of externalities is associated with
trade in and regulation of wastes. A fourth set is created by the environ-
mental effects of manufacturing and other processes for producing goods
and services, and by the regulation of such processes. Because of these
externalities, trade restrictions-broadly defined to include tariffs and other
charges as well as bans, quotas, and regulatory requirements-may be
necessary in order to promote human welfare. But a danger exists that such
restrictions can be used for protectionist or other welfare-reducing purposes.
The potential conflict between environmental measures and the FTR
cannot be dissolved by invoking the "polluter pays" principle, which holds
that the social costs attributable to pollution and other forms of environ-
12. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity
Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537 (1983).
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mental degradation should be internalized to the activities that cause them.
In the absence of such internalization, free markets will generate excessive
amounts of environmental harm, reducing societal welfare. Pollution taxes
and environmental regulation are potential means of correcting such market
failures. If state B has more stringent environmental standards than state
A, it might, for example, impose a duty on imports from A equal to the
social costs attributable to A's less stringent regulation and justify the tax
as a means of promoting market efficiency and social welfare. 3
There are, however, major difficulties in determining the social costs
of environmental degradation. Those costs are a function of the harms
caused or risks of harm posed by environmental degradation and the
economic value that individuals or societies place on avoiding such harms
or risks. That value is in turn a function of individual or societal preferences
for environmental quality versus other goods and services; wealth; and risk
aversion. There is often considerable uncertainty and sharp disagreement
about the extent of harm caused, or risks posed, by environmental degra-
dation. Individuals and societies also differ substantially in preferences,
wealth, and risk aversion. As a result, there will be wide differences in
assessments of the social costs of environmental degradation, and corre-
sponding disagreements about the appropriate stringency of the measures
needed to internalize those costs to the activities that cause them. The mere
fact that one nation's environmental standards are less stringent than
another's does not establish that the former is a "trade distortion."
There is no objective, uniform yardstick for measuring the social costs
of environmental degradation that could be used to resolve disagreements
between countries like A and B over the appropriate stringency of environ-
mental measures and determine whether the restraints on trade imposed by
a particular measure are justified by the environmental harms or risks in
question. The adverse effects of a given level of pollution may vary among
states and regions because of geographical and ecological differences. More
fundamentally, societies often differ in preferences, wealth, and risk aver-
sion. As a result, different states and nations may appropriately place
different values on environmental protection. It is accordingly quite difficult
to determine whether the environmental measures adopted by a given state
or nation are appropriate and reasonable, rather than excessively lax or
disproportionately stringent. It is also quite difficult to decide whether
measures which restrain trade and benefit local industry are justified by the
environmental benefits'they are supposed to secure or are disguised protec-
tionism. In these circumstances, it is not easy to develop principles and
institutions to harmonize trade and environmental goals in a world of many
states or nations.
A. Products
Assume that producers in state or nation A make a product which they
wish to sell in B. B, however, prohibits or (more often) imposes restrictions
13. Alternatively, A might exclude B's products until B adopts more stringent regulatory
measures.
19921 1333
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1329
or in some cases a tax on the import and sale of such products in B on
the ground that the product poses an undue risk to health, safety, or the
environment, or that such risks are not adequately disclosed in the product's
labelling. For example, the United States excludes imports of food products
with pesticide levels exceeding the tolerance levels used to regulate domestic
food products. In the case of adverse effects on consumers of the products,
such regulation must be based on a judgment that consumers are not
adequately informed of the risks in question or shortsightedly fail to give
them sufficient heed. In the case of adverse effects on third parties and the
natural environment, such regulation is premised on direct externalities. The
restrictions typically take the form of regulatory requirements relating to
the product's design, performance, or labelling.
Assuming that the product is sold in A without such restrictions, why
should B prohibit or restrict a product that A allows? B's citizens may
place a greater value on health, safety, and environmental protection than
those of A. This decision may reflect a stronger preference for environmental
quality relative to other goods and services. B's citizens also may be wealthier
than A's; the demand for environmental protection typically rises with
income. Institutional structure also influences environmental policy. Even if
preferences and wealth of consumers in the two states are similar, B's
political and administrative institutions may, for various reasons, give greater
weight to preferences for environmental protection than those of A. Alter-
natively, A may allow marketing of the product because of a political
judgment that the benefits to its producers outweigh the environmental
risks.' 4 B, however, has no interest in the welfare of A's producers and
judges that the risks to its consumers outweighs the benefits. This conclusion
may be especially likely if the product is not produced at all in B or is
produced only in small quantities. B may also impose restrictions on imports
in order to protect its producers. This restriction may take the form of a
discriminatory ban or other regulation of imported but not domestically
manufactured products or, more often, regulatory requirements and pro-
cedures that impose a greater effective burden on imports than on similar
domestic products or domestic substitutes for the imported product. The
regulatory measure may be neutral on its face, but have the practical effect
of favoring domestic producers. Examples include the ban by Minnesota of
nonrecyclable plastic milk cartons but not paperboard cartons (Minnesota
has a substantial timber products industry) 5 and Canada's heavy tax on
nornrecyclable beer containers, which has a disproportionate impact on U.S.
producers.1 6 The resulting disproportionate impact, however, does not rule
out the possibility that the measure will achieve significant environmental
protection benefits.
14. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 458 (1981).
15. See id. at 474 (upholding Minnesota regulation).
16. See Nancy Dunne & Bernard Simon, Canada-U.S. Beer War Gets Green Tinge, FIN.
TIMES, July 31, 1992, at 5.
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Whatever the reason for such restrictions-and a given restriction may
haye several explanations-they undermine the FTR by harming foreign
producers as well as both domestic and foreign consumers. Foreign prod-
ucers are disadvantaged relative to B's producers, who can reap economies
of scale in complying with B's regulatory restrictions because their sales in
B are likely to be large compared to those of foreign producers. If different
states adopt different restrictions, the ability of all producers to realize scale
economies will be diminished, the transaction costs of achieving compliance
with different requirements will be increased, and other benefits of free
trade will be reduced. This will result in economic harm to consumers in
all states, including those in B. Nonetheless, these detriments may well be
outweighed by the protection afforded to B's consumers and its environment
by the restriction.
Three institutional responses to this situation have arisen in the United
States and the European Community. The first response is adjudication by
a tribunal with authority over all of the relevant states, such as the United
States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice. The Supreme
Court found in the Commerce Clause the implied power for the Court to
invalidate state measures that unduly burdened the functioning of the
common market among the states. 17 The Court of Justice enjoys a more
explicit constitutional power to the same end. These courts' task has been
to determine whether the local benefits of a product restriction and the
interest in local autonomy outweigh the detriment to the- FTR.
Both courts have outlawed facially discriminatory state measures that
impose restrictions on imported products but do not impose those same
restrictions on domestic products. In the absence of facial discrimination,
the analysis is more contextual. Several questions are relevant. How great
is the environmental justification for the measure? How great is the detri-
ment to trade? Are there ways of achieving a similar benefit through means
that are less disruptive of trade? Is the measure framed in such a way as
to give competitive advantage to local producers, and what is the justification
for tailoring the restriction in this way as compared to other means of
protecting the environment? What is the justification for special tests or
inspection of imported goods, which may duplicate those already imposed
by the exporting state? In these contextual evaluations, the ultimate judg-
ment is one of proportionality: taking into account the importing state's
sovereignty interest, is the restraint on trade (including protectionist effects)
manifestly disproportionate to the environmental benefits achieved, consid-
ering the availability of other means of securing those benefits. In making
such judgments it is a crucial question, which court decisions do not resolve,
17. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51
(1977) (discussing burden of state law on "common market" between states in violation of
dormant Commerce Clause); Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1970) (discussing
invalidity of state law under dormant Commerce Clause due to undue burden on interstate
commerce).
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whether the court is to weigh the detriment to the welfare of consumers in
the state imposing the restriction, or only the welfare of out-of-state
producers and consumers.' The interests of in-state consumers are surely
among those protected by the FTR; it would seem that detriments to their
interests should accordingly be included in assessing the detriment to human
welfare caused by trade restrictions. On the other hand, given the premise
of political decentralization on which federal-type systems are founded, it
would seem inappropriate for a suprastate tribunal to invalidate state
legislation on the ground that the legislature had erred in determining which
regulations would best advance the net interests of its citizens. In addition,
it is difficult for a court to measure the relevant benefits and detriments.
As a result, courts have invalidated such regulations only when they lack
significant environmental justification, or a less trade restrictive alternative
with comparable regulatory benefits is available, or the measure is clearly
protectionist, or the detriments substantially outweigh the benefits. The
ultimate test is a protectionist standard of net proportionality, deferentially
applied: the extent of otherwise unobtainable environmental benefits must
be weighed against the welfare detriments of trade restrictions, giving due
respect to state political authority.
A second means of dealing with the impediments to the FTR posed by
different state product standards is to harmonize such standards through
consensus. While there have been successful efforts in the United States to
harmonize state laws through the Commission on Uniform State Laws, 19
those efforts have not included environmental product regulation. Industries
in the United States and in the European Community have in some instances
harmonized product standards-for boiler safety, electrical safety, and test-
ing procedures-in order to forestall potentially divergent state regulation,
but this technique has not been followed in the case of environmental
product regulation. Such regulation is simply too controversial and divisive
for consensus to succeed.
The third means of dealing with divergent state product standards is
through national or Community legislation setting a uniform standard for
all states. The technique of selective judicial invalidation of state regulation
is a form of partial negative harmonization which operates at "retail,"
case-by-case. Legislation operates "wholesale" and involves affirmative
harmonization requiring an across-the-board judgment of the appropriate
degree of regulation of risk. To the extent that citizens in different states
have different effective preferences for environmental protection and prod-
18. What if the product regulation also provides external benefits to other states? For
example, if New York imposes stringent air pollution regulations on automobiles sold in the
state, reduced emissions would benefit downwind states in New England. Such benefits should
presumably be included in the suprastate calculus, although the issue does not seem to have
arisen in any decided cases.
19. See, e.g., U.C.C., 1-5 U.L.A. (1958 as amended); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 U.L.A.
9 (1914 as amended); REvIsED UrNF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 290 (1992 Supp.) (1976
as amended).
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ucers in different states are differentially affected by regulation (as they
commonly are), 20 such legislation will involve a compromise among the
interests in different states as well as between producer, consumer, and
environmental interests generally. Even in the Community, where until
recently environmental legislation required member state unanimity, such
legislation has rarely followed a lowest common denominator approach, in
which the least stringent regulation of any member state is adopted for
all. 2' This approach is never followed in the United States, where states
"with more stringent environmental regulations typically use majoritarian
legislative processes to impose higher standards on states with less stringent
regulation in order to curtail the competitive advantage which laxer regu-
lation confers on industries located in those states.
When such harmonizing legislation has been adopted, the further ques-
tion remains whether a state may impose a stricter product standard.
Sometimes the legislation specifically prohibits such measures and in other
instances explicitly permits them. More often the statute is silent or ambig-
uous, and the federal courts in the United States have been left to wrestle
with the issue of preemption, sometimes applying a calculus analogous to
that used in determining, in the absence of federal legislation, whether a
state regulation offends the Commerce Clause. Such issues are just beginning
to confront the Court of Justice.?
Thus far we have been considering product bans or restrictions by the
importing state. Logically, an exporting state could also impose such res-
trictions. For example, a state could prohibit the sale within the state of
certain products deemed unduly risky and in addition prohibit its producers
from manufacturing and exporting such products.? Apart from concern
that domestically manufactured products would be illegally diverted to the
domestic market, such measures would presumably be based on concern for
the welfare of consumers or the environment in other states. Such measures,
however, have rarely if ever appeared in the United States24 or the European
Community.
20. See ROBERT A. LEONE, WHO PROFITS WINNERS, LOSERS, AND GOVERNMENT REGU-
LATION (1986).
21. See ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD B. STEWART, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW:
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY 255 (1985). Much Community environmental legislation
has been spurred by unilateral member state adoption of relatively aggressive product regulation,
which in turn creates demand for Community development of a harmonized approach. See
id. at 259. Recently, Germany's adoption of an ambitious packaging recycling law has
stimulated the Commission to develop community legislation on the subject.
22. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Law in the United States and the European
Community: Spillovers, Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming
1992).
23. Logically, a state might permit domestic manufacture and sale of a product but
prohibit ius export. But apart from concern over depletion of scarce in-state resources, discussed
below, it is hard to see why a state would adopt such a measure.
24. State prohibition laws are a possible example of product bans imposed by exporting
states.
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B. Resources
A state may impose restrictions or special taxes on the export or
appropriation by out-of-state, consumers or producers of in-state natural
resources such as natural gas, fish, and wildlife. These restrictions are
generally designed to reserve consumption of such resources to citizens of
the state, or to restrict to in-state producers the right to process the resource
and thus reap added value. Such discriminatory measures would be inad-
missible in the case of ordinary products, but have sometimes been thought
justified on the ground of a special interest of a state and its citizens in
the state's natural resources. The United States Supreme Court, however,
has found such resources to be articles of commerce like any other and
invalidated such discriminatory measures when challenged as violative of
the Commerce Clause.2Y The offensive externality is a denial of resource
access to out-of-state consumers and producers, undercutting the benefits
of a FTR. Such restrictions can not be justified by resource conservation
objectives, because similar restrictions are not imposed on in-state consumers
and producers. To the extent that the state allows a natural resource to be
treated as an article of commerce, it must be available on equal terms
throughout the common market.
The Court of Justice has apparently not addressed such issues. There
have been no substantial efforts to harmonize state laws regarding exploi-
tation of natural resources, either through consensus or legislation, in the
United States or the Community.
26
C. Wastes
Waste can be regarded as a negative product that commands a negative
price; generators have to pay others to store and dispose of their wastes. 27
Free trade in wastes28 should promote joint welfare for reasons similar to
those that justify free trade in ordinary goods and services: economies of
scale in disposal techniques, comparative advantage based on geology and
transportation access, and innovation through specialization. States in the
United States have enacted legislation banning or imposing special restric-
tions on the import and disposal within the state of out-of-state wastes.
States have sought to justify such measures by treating the issue as one of
25. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 256 U.S. 553 (1923) (invalidating West
Virginia restrictions on exports of natural gas).
26. In the United States, the federal government owns one-third of the land and has
adopted national laws and 'policies governing their use. In a few instances, such as the
Endangered Species Act, it has imposed restrictions on the use of nonfederal resources. 16
U.S.C. §§ 2404-2408 (1988).
27. If a waste commands a positive price because of the potential for recycling, it can
be regarded as a product or resource with potentially hazardous characteristics.
28. A regime of free trade in wastes assumes that the recipient of the wastes commands
and is paid a market price for disposing of them. Prohibiting illegal cross-border dumping of
wastes is entirely consistent with and indeed necessary to support a FrR.
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natural resources; the use of a state's land or air to dispose of waste ought
to be limited to in-state producers.2 9 Unlike discriminatory product import
restrictions, such measures benefit local "consumers" of environmental
quality, by reducing their exposure to waste hazards, as well as local
producers of waste. The Supreme Court, however, has properly ruled that
waste can be an article of commerce and that discriminatory state measures
that allow disposal of in-state but not out-of-state wastes offend the Com-
merce Clause because they impose trade restrictions that can not be justified
by the asserted environmentally protective purpose of the legislation. 30 But
the Court of Justice recently sustained a ban by the Belgian region of
Wallonia against imports of nonhazardous wastes." This decision may well
stimulate European Community legislation on the subject. There have been
some federal legislative efforts to address the issue of radioactive waste
disposal in the United States, 32 albeit with little success.
29. In addition, supporters of such legislation have asserted that a ban on out-of-state
wastes is necessary to create adequate incentives for minimizing waste generation and providing
adequate disposal capacity. But this argument generally fails to address the question of why
a disposal fee adequate to cover the full social costs of waste disposal could not provide the
appropriate incentives.
30. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (invalidating
discriminatory waste disposal fee imposed by state on imported wastes); Fort Gratoit Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992) (invalidating
state ban on county waste importation, on Commerce Clause grounds); Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating state ban on waste importation as violating Commerce
Clause). The restriction can also be viewed as a natural resource issue. Use of the State's land
for waste disposal should be limited to the citizens of the state. But this shift in rationale
would not change the result. The discrimination in favor of in-state users of that resource
would likewise be invalid under the Commerce Clause.
An intriguing theoretical question, which has yet to be squarely presented in litigation,
is whether facially nondiscriminatory state measures that severely restrict waste disposal in the
state might be invalidated on the ground that the state is well suited, by reasons of geology
and other factors, to serve as a disposal site, and that the benefit of reduced risk to residents
of the state is outweighed by the detriment to producers and consumers in other states, who
will have to bear disproportionately high disposal costs and environmental risk as a result. In
theory, the basic principle of proportionality applied in product regulation should apply, but
the fact that the measure is designed to favor in-state consumers rather than producers, and
that the calculus must include out-of-state environmental as well as economic costs, makes its
application quite difficult.
31. Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, (July 9, 1992); EC Court Ruling May Allow
Restrictions on Waste Imports, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 462 (July 15, 1992)
[hereinafter Waste Imports]. The Court of Justice sustained an "emergency" ban by Wallonia
on imputs of nonhazardous waste, notwithstanding the court's acknowledgement that waste
can be "goods" of commerce. The court gave weight to the goal of member state self-
sufficiency in waste disposal. The Commission had challenged the ban as a violation of the
Treaty of Rome.
32. E.g., Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1988)) (providing monetary and
waste disposal site incentives to states to encourage stricter waste disposal practices and
providing that states that fail to meet federal standards must take title to waste and thus
assume all liabilities related to waste); New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992)
(upholding monetary and access incentive provisions of Act and invalidating take title provisions
of Act).
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D. Processes
Regulation of in-state manufacturing and resource harvesting or extract-
ing processes by different states is not so clearly offensive to the FTR as
the measures surveyed above because it does not directly obstruct the free
flow of goods and services among states. But pollution and other forms of
environmental degradation caused by processes and process-based environ-
mental regulation can create several different types of troublesome exter-
nalities. These externalities include the following:
Pollution spillovers-If some of the pollution generated in A is deposited
in B, A's regulation of pollution by its producers is likely to be inadequate
because A will give little or no weight to the interests of B's residents.33 If
pollution is exactly reciprocal-if B pollutes A just as much as A pollutes
B-there may be incentives for cooperative approaches to regulation, but
such reciprocity is rare. The externality created by pollution generally
consists of negative use value; pollution increases the economic costs or
diminishes the benefits associated with resource use. Examples would include
the costs of purifying polluted water for drinking or reduced crop yields or
diminished recreational fishing opportunities due to air and water pollution.1
4
Resource externalities (use values)-A may be exploiting its resources
in a wasteful fashion, running down the resource stock at an excessive rate
and depriving consumers and producers in B of the benefit of future use
of those resources. For example, A may be overcutting its forests, driving
up the future cost of timber, or recklessly destroying pristine areas that
residents of B would spend money to visit. On standard economic assump-
tions, it is difficult to understand why A would engage in such behavior,
assuming that the lost future benefits are greater than the benefits of present
use;" shortsightedness, corruption, or some other form of institutional
failure must be invoked to explain such behavior.
Preservation externalities (nonuse values)-A may be exploiting its re-
sources in ways that deprive citizens in other states of the satisfaction of
knowing that those resources are preserved, independent of any use that
might be made of them. Examples include the destruction of pristine
environments and the eradication of endangered species. Again, the dimi-
33. Pollution, like illegally exported waste, can be viewed as a negative product that is
not exchanged in markets. However, the ability of a state to exclude, through self-help,
externally-generated pollution is far more limited than its ability to exclude externally generated
waste that must be transported across state lines by vehicles, railroads, aircraft, or ships.
34. Pollution can also impair nonuse "existence" or "bequest" values by degrading
pristine environments that individuals wish to see preserved for reasons quite apart from any
use that they might make of such environments by, for example, visiting them. See Frank B.
Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. Rav. 269 (1989).
35. The extent, if any, to which future environmental benefits should be discounted to
net present value in determining whether to incur costs today in order to provide such future
benefits is much debated. See Michael S. Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis
for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473
(1980).
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nution in welfare associated with the loss of these nonuse values may exceed
the benefits from current resource exploitation. Unlike the case with use
values, however, it is quite easy to understand why this form of welfare
impairment might arise. Preservation of natural resources for nonuse values
is a collective good. A and its citizens can not selectively provide the benefits
of preservation to those outside the state who would be willing to pay to
have those resources preserved. Because of free-rider effects, those outside
the state are unlikely to bond together and pay for such preservation.
Accordingly, the economic incentives of A and its citizens to preserve such
resources will not be adequate.
Competitiveness externalities-A may fail to adopt strong environmen-
tally protective process regulations for fear that its industries will be com-
petitively disadvantaged in relation to industries in B, who may fail to adopt
similarly strong policies. B and others may reason likewise. The result may
be a "race to the bottom" that leads everywhere to lower levels of
environmental protection than all states would prefer. The externality here
consists of uncertainty regarding the reaction of each state to the environ-
mental policy of every other state and the resultant tendency to take a risk
averse approach to the threat of job loss and industrial dislocation by
adopting less stringent environmental measures.36
A given activity may involve several or all of these analytically distinct
types of spillovers. Consider, for example, lax air pollution controls in A
that result in destruction of A's economically valuable tropical forest,
attendant species extinction, and transport of air pollution to B. B's indus-
tries incur a competitive disadvantage because of B's more stringent pollution
controls. B has little or no ability, acting unilaterally, to prevent these
spillovers. It is generally not feasible physically to block pollution spillovers.
B can not prevent A's destruction of natural resources located in A. B can
combat any competitive disadvantage suffered by its industry only by
lowering its own environmental regulatory standards or giving its regulated
industry a subsidy.3 7
36. The "race to the bottom" argument is carefully examined and criticized in RICHARD
REvESZ, REHABILITATING INTERSTATE COMPETITION: RETHINKING THE "RACE TO THE BoTToM"
RATIONALE FOR FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (forthcoming). His basic critique of the
argument is that just as consumer welfare is promoted by competition among different sellers
of goods and services, so is it also enhanced by competition among states in providing different
environmental regulatory regimes for industry and residents. Because states will differ in their
geography, ecology, state of development, and citizen preferences, there is no reason to suppose
that such competition will result in uniform or unduly lax regulation. The other forms of
externalities discussed in this article are nonpecuniary externalities-environmental and health
harms or risks that are not reflected in the market prices of factor inputs or goods and
services. However, competitiveness externalities are pecuniary externalities. According to stan-
dard economic theory, pecuniary externalities, which are reflected in market prices, should not
result in market failures. One would probably have to invoke game theory and problems of
uncertainty and strategic interdependence in order to explain how such competition might lead
states to adopt laxer environmental regulation than states would otherwise prefer.
37. B could offer A a side payment to reduce these various externalities, but strong
ethical and political inhibitions exist against such payments.
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Conceivably B could seek to deal with such externalities by excluding
imports of products manufactured by laxly controlled plants in A. B could
also impose a tariff on such imports equal to the difference in pollution
control compliance costs incurred by industries in A and those in B. Such
measures might, however, be challenged as violative of the Commerce Clause
or the Treaty of Rome. 8 The question, however, is moot, for no state in
the United States or the European Community has apparently attempted to
impose such measures, and no law exists on the issue. A federal-type system
could offer the same three solutions to these process-based spillovers that
have been discussed above in connection with product regulation: adjudi-
cation, harmonization by consensus, and harmonization through legislation.
B might challenge A's lax environmental measures in court on the
ground that the resulting negative externalities unjustifiably diminish the
welfare of all states. It would, however, be difficult to fit such a claim
within traditional common market jurisprudence. A is not restraining free
trade. If anyone is restraining trade, it is B, by trying to impose higher
production costs on A. Even if a court were to entertain such a claim, how
it would evaluate B's grievance? It would have to face all of the difficulties
in evaluating the social costs of pollution discussed above.3 9
A would respond to B's claim that it has an unfair competitive advantage
by seeking to justify its less stringent pollution controls as appropriate to
its economy, stage of development, environment, and the preferences of its
citizens. For reasons previously discussed, a court would have great difficulty
in evaluating these arguments, or in concluding that A had struck an
irrational or arbitrary balance between environmental quality and other
objectives. It would also have to give some deference to A's interests in
political autonomy. Even if a court were to conclude that A's standard was
arbitrary, what remedy would it afford? It could not simply require that A
adopt B's standards, but would presumably have to determine the lowest
nonarbitrary standard that A could adopt. It would then have to require
that A adopt, implement, and enforce such a standard.
With regard to B's claims of resource and preservation spillovers, the
court would first have to evaluate their magnitude, an extremely difficult
task, especially in the case of nonuse values. The court would then have to
weigh these negative externalities against A's justifications for its less
stringent standard and its claims of political autonomy. Again, if the court
concluded that A's standard was arbitrarily low, it would have to determine
the minimal nonarbitrary standard and require A to adopt and enforce it.
The analysis would be similar for pollution externalities. In many cases,
several or all of these spillovers would be presented, further complicating
the analysis. Any court would understandably balk at taking on these tasks.
In the case of pollution spillovers, a potential alternative remedy exists
in the form of damages for pollution injury. Because of the diffuse nature
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Treaty Establishing The European Economic Com-
munity, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
39. See discussion supra part It.
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of environmental harms and the large number of pollution sources, private
damage litigation is generally an ineffective remedy. Theoretically, state B
might sue state A for the harm inflicted on B's citizens as a result of the
pollution originating in A. But unless facilities owned or operated by A
were emitting the pollution, the court would have to make A liable for the
interstate effects of its citizen's actions-a not illogical but nonetheless
improbable jurisprudential revolution. 40 In addition, it would be extremely
difficult to resolve disputes over causation and to quantify and monetize
the injury occurring from most types of pollhtion spillovers. Alternatively,
B could be allowed to impose a tariff on imports from A equal to the
environmental damage in B, but the amount of such damage would again
be extraordinarily difficult to determine.
4'
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that, in the absence of
relevant legislation imposing an authoritative standard, no state has sought
to challenge assertedly inadequate state regulation on such grounds in the
courts of the United States or the European Community. Nor has harmo-
nization by consensus proved an effective solution to the problems generated
by different process regulatory standards in different states. The conflicts
of interest among states, different industries, and environmental advocates
have been too diverse and intense for resolution by such methods.
Harmonization of environmental regulation of processes through central
command and control regulatory legislation has been the solution adopted
in the United States and the Community to deal with process spillovers.
Often, such legislation imposes a uniform minimum level of controls re-
quired of all sources. States are typically left free to adopt more stringent
requirements. Unlike the case with state product regulations that are more
stringent than the national minimum, more stringent state process regulations
do not impose barriers to trade or generate externalities of the sort described
above.
42
The determination of the appropriate stringency of regulatory standards,
which legislation in the United States but not in the Community has generally
left to administrators, must inevitably strike a balance between environmen-
tal and economic considerations and the differing interests of states and
industry groups. The structure of standards is often as important as the
level set because adoption of common standards does not mean that all
firms in a given industry will be faced with the same compliance costs. For
example, uniform environmental quality standards-specifying the maximum
permissible concentration of pollutants in the air or water-give a relative
40. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) [hereinafter
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?].
41. Also, there are theoretical grounds for concluding that such a tariff would not
produce the appropriate level of pollution control in A. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE
E. OATEs, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1988).
42. More stringent process regulation by B may, by lowering the level of economic
activity in B, nonetheless have the indirect effect of lowering economic activity in A.
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advantage to those states where air, or water is relatively unpolluted because
they can accommodate new industry and additional pollution without vio-
lating the standards. By contrast, uniform technology based standards deny
such states competitive advantage, although different sources will face
different compliance costs depending on their circumstances (including such
things as a plant's age or processes) and precisely how the standards are
framed. Different states and businesses will also be affected differently by
a system that imposes more demanding standards on new sources than on
existing souices as compared to a system that imposes the same controls
on both.
The struggle among the contending interests has resulted in extremely
complex regulatory legislation in the United States, of which the Clean Air
Act is the most notable example. 43 For example, regional and other political
and economic conflicts blocked congressional agreement on measures to
deal with acid precipitation for thirteen years. 44 The problem of reaching
workable compromise has been even more notable in the Community, which
until recently could enact environmental legislation only by unanimous
agreement in the Council .4 There has been growing interest in the United
States and the Community with the use of economic incentives, such as
taxes and transferrable permits, in lieu of command and control regulation
to achieve environmental goals. By lowering the costs of reaching agreement
and affording states and industry greater flexibility, such measures may
facilitate agreement. For example, in the United States the legislative logjam
on acid rain was broken by adoption of a Bush administration proposal to
use a system of transferrable pollution permits to reduce sulfur emissions.
46
Legislation is generally not aimed at one particular kind of spillover,
although pollution spillovers and economic competition among states for
industry have figured prominently in the history of legislation both in the
United States and the Community. In the.1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
Congress did, however, specifically address preservation spillovers by im-
posing special limitations on pollution increases (and therefore on devel-
opment) in pristine areas. 47 Nor does legislation provide explicit remedies
43. The Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857g (1990)).
44. See generally Theodore L. Garret & Sonya D. Winner, A Clean Air Act Primer.
Part 1, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,159 (Mar. 1992).
45. See Christian Zacker, Environmental Law of the European Economic Community:
New Powers Under the Single European Act, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 249, 254 (1991)
(describing qualified majority voting procedures adopted by Single European Act). The Maas-
tricht Treaty would further expand the use of qualified majority voting in community
environmental legislation.
46. See Garret & Winner, supra note 44, at 10,162.
47. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7450-7459 (1988)) (amended 1990). Industrial and labor interests in the Midwest
and Northeast supported such legislation in order to discourage shift of industrial development
to the South and West. See B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests
Are Being Protected?, 23 EcoN. INQUIRY 551 (1985).
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for "retail" disputes, where a particular state complains that an upwind or
upstream states is creating excessive pollution spillovers notwithstanding its
compliance with uniform standards.
48
The experience in federal-type systems such as the European Community
and the United States thus illustrates important differences in the environ-
mental, economic, political, and institutional implications of different kinds
of externalities.
III. SPECIAL FEATURES OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT ISSUES IN AN
INTERNATIONAL- SETTING
The natural, economic, and institutional features of the international
setting give trade and environment issues a different character than those
in a federal-type system such as the United States and the European
Community.
Some resources are beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any state. The
most notable examples are Antarctica, the oceans, and the living resources
which each contain. The global atmosphere is likewise outside the jurisdic-
tion of any nation, although this feature does not distinguish it from
airsheds shared by states in a federal-type system. What distinguishes the
global atmosphere from regional airsheds (apart from the fact that it extends
over areas, such as Antarctica and the oceans that are not within any state's
territorial jurisdiction) is the more or less uniform mixing within the
atmosphere of certain pollutants, such as Greenhouse gases (GHGs) and
Chloroflourocarbons (CFCs), creating a situation of reciprocal pollution.
49
There are many more nations in the world than are part of the United
States, much less the European Community. Moreover, far greater disparities
exist among world nations-in terms of natural resources, economic devel-
opment, wealth, education, and governmental systems-than are found in
federal-type systems. Even the North/South division that has figured so
prominently in the UNCED Rio "Summit" and other discussions of inter-
national environmental law and policy ignores many differences among the
"North" and the "South" nations. For example, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations, the "Asian Tigers," the
nations of subsaharan Africa, and the Latin American countries have quite
divergent interests.
There is no international legislative authority with power to enact
statutes that bind nations. The World Court exercises adjudicatory authority
only with respect to controversies between nations as such, when such
48. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304 (1981).
49. The adverse environmental effects of stratospheric ozone depletion and global warm-
ing are not, however, uniform across nations.
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nations have voluntarily consented to the Court's jurisdiction. 0 That juris-
diction is limited and rarely invoked. The adjudicatory authority of GATT
tribunals and other tribunals created 'by bilateral or regional trade or
environmental agreements such as the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (FTAY' has been used only intermittently. The underdeveloped
state of international institutions has made' it far more difficult to develop
either a FTR or an effective system of environmental protection among
nations than among the states in a federal-type system like the United States
or the European Community. They likewise greatly complicate the problem
of reconciling free trade and environmental protection.
The GATT is a world FTR regime created by consensus among the
participating nations.12 Some of its basic ground rules, such as the require-
ment of national treatment and provisions recognizing, within limits, the
authority of nations to exclude risky products, are consistent with those
developed by the United States Constitution and the United States Supreme
Court, and by the Treaty of Rome and the European Court of Justice.5 a
There are special provisions, however, such as those recognizing the nations'
interest in avoiding balance-of-payments problems, that are unique to an
international system of independent nations. The GATT also provides for
dispute-resolution institutions-Panel tribunals with a right of appeal to a
council composed of representatives of all nations that are parties to the
GATT-to make the inevitably contextual judgments involved in application
of these broad principles in particular cases. The procedure for appeal of
GATT panel decisions to an essentially political process of negotiation
among participating nations in the council again reminds us that the GATT
is an association of independent nations and not a federal-type system that
establishes sovereign suprastate authority. The GATT does not specifically
address environmental issues as such. A working group on trade and
environmental issues, authorized in 1971, had never met until recently, and
environmental groups have come to regard the GATT as at best indifferent
and often hostile to environmental concerns.14
International environmental protection has theoretical roots in custom-
ary international law, which has articulated a general obligation of nations
not to act in ways that inflict injury on the territory of another nation. But
the precise nature and content of this obligation remains quite unclear
because virtually no relevant decisions have been made by the World Court
or other international tribunals. Most international environmental law has
grown out of bilateral or multilateral treaties.55 The negotiation of these
50. See MANLEY 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 18-21
(1925); MANLEY 0. HUDSON, A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at
410-11 (1943).
51. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter FTA].
52. GATT, sdpra note 8, 61 Stat. at All, 55 U.N.T.S. at 194-96.
53. Id. art. III, 61 Stat. at A19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204-08.
54. See, e.g., Alex Hittle, Trade and the Environment at an Impasse, ENVTL. F., July-
Aug. 1992, at 26, 26.
55. See, e.g., infra notes 56-62.
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agreements is a slow and cumbersome process, and each sovereign nation
may decide whether to adhere to them. The great differences among nations
produce acute conflicts of interest that impede agreement. Substantial pro-
gress has nonetheless been made in reaching or developing multilateral
agreements dealing with endangered species,5 6 chemical testing and label-
ling,17 the development of Antarctica,"8 hazardous waste treatment,59 deple-
tion of stratospheric ozone due to emissions of CFCs and other chemicals,60
global warming, 61 and biological diversity 2 It is noteworthy that these
agreements have not been focused on one particular type of externality,
such as product risks, but encompass many different types of environmental
problems. In addition, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
has set an important precedent by specifically addressing environmental
issues in the context of a regional trade liberalization agreement.
63
Even when agreements have been reached, there remains the problem
of nonsignatories who seek to free-ride on others' efforts to preserve
common resources or reduce pollution spillovers. Monitoring, implementa-
tion, and enforcement are also serious problems, as environmental groups
have pointed out in the debate over the environmental aspects of the
proposed NAFTA pact with Mexico." There is no supranational environ-
mental police or regulatory authority. Reliance must be placed on infor-
mation exchange, scientific and public opinion, moral suasion, and the
implicit threat that sanctions, such as trade restrictions, and side benefits,
such as aid, will be imposed on or withheld from those who do not comply.65
The development of international agreements to protect the environment
has been fostered by the rise of international and regional scientific and
cooperative intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that have generated information about international
56. See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
57. See, e.g., OECD Principles of Good Laboratory Practice, OECD Doc. ENV/CHEM/
HLM/80.1 (Apr. 11, 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1057.
58. See, e.g., Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities,
June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868.
59. See, e.g., Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel Convention].
60. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete The Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550, amended and adjusted 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991) [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol].
61. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 899.
62. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822.
63. See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: IssuES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 131-53 (1992).
64. See J. Ward, Environmental Enforcement: Unfinished Business in North American
Trade, Testimony of the Natural Resources Defense Council Before the Senate Finance
Committee Subcommittee on International Trade (Sept. 16, 1992).
65. See generally BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING
THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME (1988).
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environmental issues and encouraged the adoption of cooperative measures
to deal with them. Some of these IGOs, such as the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Conference on En-
vironment and Development (UNCED), and the Council of Europe, have
served as a forum for the negotiation of international agreements and for
monitoring their implementation.
6
Given the dearth of international authority to adjudicate environmental
controversies, the slow pace of negotiating international agreements, and
the problems of implementing and enforcing these agreements, it is not
surprising that some nations, prodded by environmental groups, have fa-
vored unilateral national action to deal with environmental externalities.
These measures include restrictions on both the export and import of
assertedly hazardous products, wastes, and natural resources. Attention,
particularly in the United States, has also focused on the possibility of
prohibiting or taxing product imports, not on the ground that the product
itself is risky, but on the ground that the process is not adequately regulated
by the nation exporting the product. 67 In some instances trade restrictive
measures aimed at assertedly inadequate environmental regulation by non-
signatories have been authorized by international agreements. In other
instances no effective international agreement has been completed on the
subject and the restriction is imposed unilaterally.
In federal-type systems, unilateral adoption by a sufficiently powerful
state of stringent product standards that disadvantage out-of-state producers
has sometimes had the effect of stimulating legislation to adopt a uniform
rule on the subject in order to reestablish a regulatory "level playing field"
for competition. This pattern has been particularly marked in the European
Community." To take a recent example, Germany's adoption of a strong
packaging recycling law has sparked proposals by other member states and
the Commission for Community for legislation on the subject. Member
states or industries disadvantaged by another member state's unilateral
adoption of product regulations that have the effect of restricting trade
have the option of challenging them in court, but litigation is slow, and
66. Other relevant institutional actors include international financial institutions, such as
the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the other
multilateral development banks, which have, as the result of pressure from environmental
groups and some member governments, especially the United States, begun to examine the
environmental consequences of projects that they fund. In some instances projects have been
cancelled or modified because of environmental concerns. Attention is now beginning to reach
beyond project-by-project environmental assessment to efforts to develop the environmental
legal and administrative infrastructure of the less developed countries and the nations of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The lack of legal and administrative capacities
in such nations is a major barrier to effective environmental protection.
67. The United States Environmental Protection Agency is also taking steps to elicit a
commitment by U.S.-based multinationals to assure adherence to U.S. environmental standards
and compliance practices at facilities located abroad.
68. See supra note 21.
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the Court of Justice has shown marked sympathy for environmental regu-
lation. 69
It is far more difficult to adopt effective regulatory law in the inter-
national rather than in the federal-type context. This difference has been
thought to justify unilateral action to protect the environment in a world
where law is thin. But, such actions may be challenged by other nations as
violative of the GATT. The very difficulty of obtaining harmonized measures
through international treaties will encourage such challenges. Such challenges
not only raise the validity of such trade-restraining measures under the
provisions of the GATT agreement, but present larger issues about the
appropriate role of trade restrictions in promoting environmental protection
goals in the international context, and whether the GATT is the appropriate
forum for resolving asserted conflicts between trade and the environment.
The experience in both the United States and the European Community
in dealing with asserted conflicts between state regulation and free trade
has been one of reliance on dispute resolution institutions-the Supreme
Court and the Court of Justice-whose initial and primary mission was to
nurture and protect a common market based on free trade. With the rise
of environment, health, and safety regulations by member states, these
tribunals had necessarily to consider how such measures might be reconciled
with a FTR. It is fair to say that both the Supreme Court and the Court
of Justice have appreciated the force of environmental and other regulatory
objectives and done a generally skillful job of accommodating them and
the FTR.
Controversy surrounding a GATT panel decision invalidating an envi-
ronmentally-related U.S. law on tuna imports, and the heightened salience
of trade and environment issues generally, has led GATT to issue a report
on Trade and the Environment.70 Its tone is disappointingly defensive and
doctrinaire, reinforcing environmentalists' antipathy to GATT. The GATT
itself fails to squarely address environmental issues, or the reconciliation of
environmental protection with a FTR. Nonetheless, there is no reason in
principle why GATT should not be capable of an evolution similar to that
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Justice, notwithstanding GATT's
very different character. And while the provisions in the GATT governing
trade and environmental issues are sparse and unspecific, they are far more
ample than the Commerce Clause and scarcely less delphic than the original
Treaty of Rome. While amendments to the GATT to deal more specifically
with trade and environment issues may well be desirable, the current GATT
text provides sufficient flexibility to afford environmental values equal
footing with free trade values.
69. See Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark (Re Disposable Cases of Beer), 1988
E.C.R. 4607, 1 C.M.L.R. 619 (1989) (upholding, in major part, Denmark's requirement for
recycling beverage containers despite adverse competitive effect on German beer companies);
Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium (July 9, 1992); Waste Imports, supra note 31.
70. See generally GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARiFFs AND TRADE SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (1992) [hereinafter GATT SECRETARIAT].
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GATT will be especially likely to develop an environmental orientation
if it fears a loss of jurisdiction to other international organizations such as
UNEP or UNCED. Environmentalists have threatened such a transfer of
jurisdiction. But rationalization of the trade and environment interface
would be far more difficult for an institution created to deal with environ-
mental matters than one created to deal primarily with trade matters. It is
important for the success of the FTR that there be consistency in the
principles governing the relation between trade and different systems of
national and international social and economic regulation. If there should
be a separate trade and regulatory regime for environmental issues under
the aegis of an international environmental agency, then the same approach
could logically be applied in labor, consumer protection, antitrust, and other
fields, producing a balkanization of the principles governing trade. This
strategy would be comparable to transferring decisions about the validity
of state regulations governing the common market from the United States
Supreme Court or the Court of Justice to specialized administrative agencies
in Washington or Brussels. This is not to say that free trade concerns
should trump environmental or other social regulatory issues. However, an
international tribunal rooted in the global trade regime has a better chance
to harmonize trade and social regulatory concerns than a plethora of
tribunals with special regulatory missions. Moreover, as a practical matter,
there is no prospect that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) nations would agree to transfer adjudicatory respon-
sibility from the GATT or authorities established by bilateral or regional
free trade regimes to institutions such as UNEP. If the GATT did not exist,
something like it would have to be invented to deal with the problems
created by environmentally-related trade restrictions.
GATT is a highly imperfect institution. Its stature as a dispute-resolving
tribunal falls far short of the Supreme Court or the Court of Justice. There
is an urgent need to make its decisional processes more transparent and
accessible .7 For analytic purposes, the discussion that follows disregards
GATT's limitations and asks what principles or tribunals established under
regional trade agreements such as the NAFTA ought to apply to contro-
versies over environmentally-related trade restrictions, assuming it had bind-
ing adjudicatory authority. This assumption is later relaxed to consider
briefly how such principles might be developed in the present, confused
"third best" world of international institutions. 72
IV. PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE FOR TRADE-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
What considerations, then, should guide determination by GATT or its
equivalent of the validity of national measures with asserted environmental
71. See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence
or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992).
72. See infra notes 108-21.
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justifications that restrict trade? It is essential, first, to distinguish between
trade-restrictive measures undertaken unilaterally by a nation and those
taken pursuant to an international convention. It is also essential to distin-
guish between the different types of environmental externalities addressed
by a given measure.
A. Unilateral Measures
Products-Consider first, unilateral restrictions on product imports based
on regulations designed to prevent environmental, health, and safety risks
in the importing nation. The issues presented in assessing the justifications
for such regulations, their competitive impact, and the appropriate balance
between free trade and regulatory restrictions on products are very similar
to these presented in a federal-type systems. In principle, there appears to
be no reason why a GATT-type tribunal should not be able to evolve a
satisfactory body of international law to govern the subject. In practice,
however, trade rivalries are likely to be sharper, and the difficulty of
resolving controversy over the scientific analysis of risk and appropriate
risk management policies greater, in the international context than in a
federal-type system. United States-European Community disputes over EC
exclusion of meat from U.S. cattle which have received bovine growth
hormone (BGH) and U.S. exclusion of EC wine with trace pesticide residues
illustrate how contentious issues of science and risk management can be.
Science often tells us that the level of risk is highly uncertain. Also,
differences in risk management approaches cannot be dissolved by appeals
to "sound science."
The dispute between the United States and Canada over Canada's heavy
tax on nonusable beer containers also illustrates the difficulty of evaluating
the extent of environmental justification for measures that have the effect
of protecting domestic producers.7 3 U.S. environmentalists are fearful that
the GATT and other free trade agreements-will result in wholesale invali-
dation of U.S. product regulations, such as those aimed at pesticide resi-
dues.7 4 While some U.S. regulation, such as the zero-tolerance standard for
carcinogens imposed by the Delaney Amendment, 75 might be suspect, knowl-
edgeable observers believe that the GATT standards are substantially more
73. See Dunne & Simon, supra note 16, at.5. The tax on nonusable beer containers has
a protectionist effect because U.S. importers must either return empty containers to the United
States, thereby incurring extra transportation and handling costs, or establish recycling facilities
in Canada, where their sales volume is less than Canadian producers and they are unable to
realize full scale economies. The European Court of Justice sustained a similar Danish recycling
regulation despite its adverse impact on German brewers. See supra note 69.
74. See GATT Language Would Undermine FIFRA, Other Environmental Laws, Group
Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 62 (Jan. 8, 1992); GATT Threatens to Preempt States'
Rights to Make Policy, Annual Meeting of NCSL Told, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1349
(Aug. 5, 1992).
75. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (1988) (enabling Secretary to establish tolerance limitation).
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deferential to national regulation than those applied by the United States
Supreme Court and the Court of Justice to state regulation. 76
Restriction of product exports such as pesticides and other chemicals
or products banned from use in the country of manufacture has been a
controversial issue in international environmental policy for which there is
no precedent in federal-type systems. In principle, at least, there is no
reason why a pesticide banned in a nation with a developed economy and
a vulnerable ecosystem might nonetheless, in some cases, appropriately be
used in a less developed country with greater assimilative capacity.7 7 In
practice, however, there is grave doubt over the ability of the governments
of many less developed countries (LDCs) to make and enforce appropriate
judgments about risk because of inexperience, limited administrative capa-
bility, corruption, and other factors that make regimes unduly beholden to
development interests. Outright bans on exports from developed countries
have been urged by environmental groups, but the developed countries have
generally instead required some form of advance notice and consent by the
importing country. From the viewpoint of traditional FTR conceptions, a
flat ban on manufacture of a chemical would not be problematic, because
nations have not been thought to be obliged to produce specific goods and
services even though they might be beneficial articles of international com-
merce. Under a "greater includes the lesser" analysis, it is hard to see how
restrictions or conditions on exports, if applied in an even-handed fashion,
would be any more subversive of the FTR than an outright ban. In practice,
efforts have been made to ensure that notification and prior consent
procedures are structured so as not to offend the letter of the GATT's
requirements.
Natural Resources-Some nations have sought to impose restrictions on
the export of natural resources designed to favor in-state consumption or
processing. For example, the United States banned the export of Alaska oil
to Japan, and some nations have restricted the export of unprocessed timber.
Such restrictions are clearly inconsistent with FTR principles as developed
in federal-type systems; so are dual price tariff systems-for example, a
much higher tariff on imports of processed than on unprocessed timber-
designed to favor processing within the importing state. Efforts to subsidize
in-state producers are objectionable on environmental as well as economic
grounds because they often encourage wasteful over-exploitation of the
resource. Principles of state sovereignty are, however, more strongly held
with respect to resources than products, and there is sentiment that natural
resources stand on a different footing than manufactured products. But this
sentiment, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, can not be
squared with a FTR. Nor is it required by considerations of environmental
policy. Restricting exploitation of natural resources to nationals does not
76. See Jackson, supra note 71, at 1235-39.
77. Of course, it does not follow that just because a nation is less developed that its
environment is less susceptible to environmental degradation.
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ensure their wise maintenance. In many LDCs, infusions of foreign capital,,
technology, and know-how, combined with the development of improved
property-right incentives, will be needed in order to maintain the resource
base and promote sustainable development.78 GATT disapproval of natural
resource autarky, coupled with the development by international environ-
mental and financial organizations of supporting measures to prom6te wise
resource management, is likely to be the path of progress.
79
Wastes-The analysis with respect to wastes is similar to that for natural
resources. In the international, as in the federal-type context, a ban on
imports of out-of-state wastes offends FTR principles and is also unsound
from a long-run environmental perspective. There are economies of scale
and specialization in waste handling, treatment, and disposal. Also, some
land disposal is inevitable for the foreseeable future, and different nations
are better or less well equipped depending on geology, population density,
and other factors, to provide appropriate disposal. Although risks associated
with transportation of hazardous wastes must also be considered, a rule
requiring each nation to dispose entirely of its own waste would not be
economically or environmentally sound. Illegal waste transport and disposal
have made a mockery of international efforts to prohibit all toxic and
radioactive waste imports.8 0 On the other hand, legitimate concerns remain
about the capability of less developed nations to effectively regulate disposal
of imported wastes. These concerns justify requirements like those in the
Basel Convention for notification and prior consent and for ultimate ex-
porting state responsibility for proper disposal .8 Such requirements alone
are, however, unlikely to prevent illegal, corrupt, or improper waste trans-
port and disposal. There is also a need for new international institutions to
monitor waste shipment and disposal in accordance with standards and
procedures established by international agreement.
Processes-Conceivably a nation might forbid the export of technology
to nations who would use it as part of environmentally destructive produc-
tion processes. Bans on pesticide exports could be understood in such terms,
but no more general practice has yet emerged. Restrictions on product
imports aimed at adverse environmental effects associated with the processes
by which those products are produced present difficult issues, which have
become a storm center of controversy following a GATT panel's decision
invalidating U.S. prohibitions on the import of tuna caught through fishing
78. Considerations of maintaining the resource base and promoting sustainable devel-
opment counsel against flat bans by importing states of products harvested without proper
management of the natural resource base. See infra notes 93-97.
79. Differential importing state taxation of unprocessed and processed natural resources
should be scrutinized in accordance with the, general principles governing state taxation
developed in federal-type systems such as the United States and the European Community.
80. See ELi LouKA, THE TRANSNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS AND RADIOACTIVE
WASTES (1992). A ban on waste imports can greatly increase the costs of disposal in some
nations, creating added pressure for illegal disposal.
81. Basel Convention, supra note 59, at 664.
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practices that cause the incidental taking of porpoise in greater numbers
than allowed by U.S. law.82 Other examples include existing or proposed
bans on imports of tropical hardwood timber, Canadian sealskin and
Canadian lobster. 3 Many of these prohibitions have been imposed by the
United States, which has also asserted unilateral authority to ban imports
of product X from a country because of opposition to the process by which
that country produces an unrelated product Y. Examples include threatened
prohibition of imports of fish products and pearls from Japan because of
opposition to Japanese whaling practices and imports of tortoise shell
products respectively." There is also growing talk in the United States of
imposing countervailing duties on imports of products manufactured through
industrial processes that do not meet U.S. environmental standards, either
on the grounds that the less stringent exporting state's environmental stan-
dards represent an export subsidy that is countervailable, or violate anti-
dumping laws because the total social costs borne by consumers in the
producing state, including pollution as well as ordinary product costs, are
greater than the costs charged consumers in the importing state (ecodump-
ing), or are a general form of unfair competition. These proposals would
seek to tax the "embedded pollution" in product imports.
As previously noted, there is no precedent in federal-type systems for
such measures. This circumstance may reflect a number of factors including
the relatively recent rise of environmental concerns, the fact that process
spillovers have been more readily addressed by legislation in the United
States and the European Community than internationally, and the relatively
limited leverage that a single state would exercise."5 In analyzing the validity
and wisdom of such measures in the absence of precedent, it is important
to distinguish among the different types of environmental externalities
generated by different process and regulatory practices in different nations.
82. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594. (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin
Panel Report].
83. See, e.g., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Ocean and Coastal
Program Authorization Act of 1989 § 8, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(l)(J) (West Supp. 1992) (banning
sales of small lobsters and lobsters bearing eggs in interstate commerce); Maura Dolan, EPA
Chief Rebuffed In Plea for Nature Treaty Changes, L.A. Tn, ms, June 5, 1992, at A15
(discussing Malaysian opposition at Rio Summit to proposed ban on sale of tropical hard-
woods); Law Bars Trade in Small Lobsters, BosToN GLOBE, Dec. 13, 1989, at 42 (discussing
restriction on small lobster sales in response to Canadian practices); Nicolaas Van Rijn, Seal-
Killing Opponent Backs Greeland Hunt, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 22, 1992, at A9 (discussing
European Community ban on harp seal furs and opposition to seal hunt off Canada's east
coast).
84. See Keith Bradsher, Sea Turtles Put New Friction in U.S.-Japan Trade Quarrels,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1991, at Al; David E. Sanger, Japan, Backing Down, Plans Ban on
Rare Turtle Imports, N.Y. Tiars, June 20, 1991, at D6.
85. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 40. Particularly in a 50-state system
such as the United States, the economic power of all but a few states would be too small to
exercise substantial leverage through an import ban or tax.
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Competitiveness spillovers have been a particular focus of attention in
the United States. Some assert that unless other nations adopt relatively
stringent U.S. environmental standards, U.S. industry will suffer a serious
competitive disadvantage, leading to "industrial flight," and job losses.
s6
These assertions raise difficult and controversial issues. Most empirical
studies by economists conclude that environmental regulatory costs are
generally not a significant factor in industrial location decisions or trade
performanceY But, there are clear examples of "industrial flight" in a few
limited contexts-such as the relocation of furniture finishing operations
from Los Angeles to Tiajuana, Mexico."8 In addition, there are indications
of some displacement of pollution-intensive industry in the chemical sector
from North America to Southeast Asia. 9 Even in the absence of significant
relocation, U.S. industry may suffer some comparative competitive disad-
vantage, particularly if the calculus of costs includes not-only capital outlays
and operating costs incurred in order to comply with regulatory require-
ments, but also includes the invisible costs imposed by liability risk and
regulatory constraints, delays and uncertainty, which are especially high in
the U.S. legal and administrative system. 90 These costs are far greater for
new products and processes than existing ones, and may cause long-term
impairment of comparative advantage even without any relocation of existing
capacity. On the other hand, environmental regulations may create some
competitive advantages by encouraging the development of environmentally
superior processes that can be sold in the export market or that improve
efficiency in resource use.
Because of the difficulties in establishing the extent of competitive
disadvantage that may result from a nation's adoption of more stringent
86. See Dennis Eckart, Free Trade Shouldn't Mean Exporting Pollution, ENVTL. F.,
July-Aug. 1992, at 24, 24. Eckart was a Congressman from Ohio.
87. For a review of the relevant literature, see Judith M. Dean, Trade and the Environ-
ment: A Survey of the Literature, in INTERNATIONAL TAE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 1, at 15. Environmental regulatory outlays average less than .6% of production costs for
U.S. industry as a whole, although particular industries have higher burdens; the maximum is
just over 3% for the cement industry. See Patrick Low, Trade Measures and Environmental
Quality: The Implications for Mexico's Exports, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 1, at 105. However, these figures do not fully reflect the adverse impacts
of the legalistic U.S. regulatory system on investment and innovation. Developing countries
have increased their relative share of higher-polluting "duty" industry, but this fact may be
due to their stage of industrialization rather than laxer environmental standards. See Robert
E. B. Lucas et al., Economic Development, Environmental Regulation and the International
Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution: 1960-1988, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT, supra note 1, at 67; Patrick Low & Alexander Yeats, Do "Duty" Industries Migrate,
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 89.
88. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFECE, REPORT ON THE FURNITURE FINISHING INDUSTRY;
Chris Kraul, A Warmer Climate for Furniture Makers, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1990, at DI.
89. See The Allure of Southeast Asia's Chemical Market, CHEMICAL WK., at 42 (discussing
investment by chemical companies from United States and other countries in Southeast Asia).
90. Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework. 69 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1981).
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environmental regulation, disputes over the justification for import duties
and other trade restrictions assertedly designed to offset such disadvantage
will depend on who has the burden of proof. Given the clear potential for
serious protectionist abuse of such measures, the burden of proving serious
competitive disadvantage should rest with those who would restrict trade.9'
There is, however, a more fundamental objection to such measures. As
the opinion of the GATT panel in the tuna/dolphin case correctly observes,
no reason exists why differences in environmental conditions and preferences
among different nations and consequent differences in process regulations
should not be regarded as an appropriate aspect of comparative advantage.
The "level playing field" principle underlying proposals to equalize envi-
ronmental compliance costs admits of no stopping point. It would equally
apply to labor and wage policies, education policy, tax policy, and the
entire array of government social and regulatory policies that affect pro-
duction costs. In the contemporary world, any effort to distinguish "nat-
ural" advantages from those created by government policy is bootless.
Equalizing all costs of production would produce a world without any trade
at all. Moreover, problems of establishing cost differentials and allocations
raise such intractable problems that unilateral tariffs or other measures
assertedly designed to correct competitiveness differentials would in practice
be extraordinarily arbitrary.
Of course it may be appropriate, from the viewpoint of advancing
environmental protection, to encourage a degree of harmonization of process
standards by agreement in order to obviate fear of a "race to the bottom."
There is also justifiable concern that many LDCs may, because of govern-
mental failings, fail to adopt and enforce adequate and appropriate process
regulatory standards, even when their distinctive economic and environmen-
tal circumstances are taken into account. But this concern would not justify
a developed nation B from unilaterally imposing trade restrictions in order
to induce a less developed nation A to adopt B's standards. At best, A
should adopt standards appropriate to its circumstances. But, for reasons
previously noted, 92 there is enormous indeterminacy in setting such stan-
dards. To allow B, an obviously self-interested party, to decide unilaterally
what environmental standards are appropriate for A would invite grossly
arbitrary decisions. International agreements on process standards, comple-
mented by appropriate forms of financial, institutional, and technological
assistance to LDCs, are the appropriate response to the "race to the bottom"
concern. Unilateral process-based trade restrictions are unlikely in the long
run to be effective in dealing either with the "race to the bottom" concerns
or the special circumstances of LDCs.
Unilateral imposition of product bans in an effort to force nations to
protect their natural resources and use them more wisely is also squarely
91. To the extent that comparative disadvantage is attributable to inefficiencies in a
nation's choice of regulatory instruments or its legal and administrative system rather than
higher environmental standards as such, the appropriate remedy is to reduce those inefficiencies.
92. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent with the FTR and hard to justify on environmental grounds.
Unwise management of natural resources may indeed diminish their use and
nonuse value to citizens of other nations. But determining the extent of
such losses is in practice an impossible task. Claims of impaired use values
are based ultimately on a premise of institutional corruption or incompetence
in the host nation and would be difficult and painful to resolve. Even if
corruption or incompetence were established, how would one determine the
amount of increased use value that the resources would provide if properly
managed? Nonuse values are even more difficult to determine because there
are generally no good market proxies for them; one must rely on highly
controversial and as yet untested contingent valuation studies that generate
a wildly broad range of values. 9 These uncertainties would make it prac-
tically impossible to determine the extent of any externalities involved and
to devise proportionate corrective measures, such as countervailing tariffs.
Product bans assertedly designed to prevent such externalities would be
arbitrary at best and a handy pretext for protectionism. Using this analysis,
the decision of the FTA panel upholding a United States ban on "under-
sized" lobster from Canadian waters9 can not be sustained. Bans on resource
imports may be counterproductive; by shutting off markets, they may
undercut the economic incentives of exporting countries for appropriate
resource management. Trade-based economic incentives, such as that ne-
gotiated by Merck and Costa Rica for preservation of biological diversity, 95
which rely on property-rights carrots rather than the unilateral stick of trade
restrictions are likely to be a more effective means of promoting wise
resource management.9
Exploitation of Resources in the Global Commons-The matter stands
somewhat differently, however, in the case of resources that are part of the
commons, wholly outside any nation's territory. Examples include the
oceans, Antarctica, and the stratosphere. For resources within national
territory, the interests of the citizenry, reinforced by the prospect of trade
93. Contingent valuation studies seek to determine the monetary value that individuals
place on nonuse resource values by asking a sample of persons hypothetical questions about
how much they would be willing to pay to preserve a resource or how much they would
demand in compensation for its degradation or destruction. See Cross, supra note 34; Richard
B. Stewart, Tort Liability for Natural Resource Damages: A Category Mistake (forthcoming).
94. Lobsters from Canada, USA 89-1807-01, Final Report of the Panel, 1990 WL 299945
(Binational Panel May 25, 1990). The United States sought to defend the restriction on
undersized lobsters as a resource preservation measure. An attempt to justify the ban as a
corrective to unfair competition should, on the analysis previously developed, be equally
unavailing. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Binational Secretariat: Background
Note on the FTA Binational Secretariat and a Status Report of All Cases Filed with the
Secretariat Under Chapters 18 and 19, Jan. 30, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 181, 189.
95. See sources cited infra note 96.
96. Graeme Browning, Biodiversity Battle, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 8, 1992, at 1827; Julia
Preston, A Biodiversity Pact with a Premium: U.S. Fears Rio Treaty Would Threaten Kindred
Concessions in Future, WASH. Post, June 9, 1992, at A16; Michael Unger, Firms Say Rio
Treaty Strikes at Heart of Biotech Industry, NEWSDAY, June 14, 1992, at 73.
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(including tourism), provide at least some incentives for the establishment
of systems of property rights and regulation to protect the resource. In
addition, important considerations of national sovereignty cut strongly against
the unilateral use by other nations of trade restrictions to induce the host
nation to adopt more protective environmental measures domestically. Both
of these considerations are absent in the case of the resources of the ocean
and Antarctica. 97 Without an international agreement, there is no system of
property rights or regulation protecting resources such as whales or strato-
spheric ozone. All too often, the result is a textbook example of the tragedy
of the global commons. An unregulated regime of free trade will simply
hasten the tragedy rather than advance the common welfare. In these
circumstances, it is far easier to justify restrictions on products from other
nations that have been produced through means that destroy the commons
resource base. Use by nations of self-help to preserve that resource base is,
in principle, a fair response to those who would use self-help to destroy it.
But, this principle does not provide carte blanche for trade restrictions.
Such restrictions must, as in the context of restrictions on product imports
based on the risks posed by the products themselves, advance environmental
rather than protectionist goals and do so through means whose adverse
effects on trade are not unduly disproportionate to the environmental
benefits obtained.
Using this analysis, the GATT panel in the tuna/dolphin case9 may
well have reached the correct result, but for the wrong reasons. 99 This now-
celebrated case involved a U.S. ban on imports of tuna caught by Mexican
fishing boats on the high seas through practices that resulted in an incidental
take of dolphin in greater numbers than that allowed by U.S. law.""' The
basic rationale of the panel decision was that the FTR would be seriously
-idndermined by restrictions on trade in products that were not based on the
environmental risks posed by the products themselves but by the process by
which they were produced, and that GATT Articles XX(b) and XX(g)
should, therefore, be interpreted with the rest of the GATT to require a
total ban on process-based product import restrictions.' 0 The recent GATT
Secretariat Report on Trade and the Environment strongly defended this
reasoning, asserting that "[i]f the door were opened to use trade policies
unilaterally to offset the competitiveness effects of different environmental
standards, or to attempt to force other countries to adopt domestically-
favoured practices and policies, the trading system would start down a very
slippery slope."' 0 2 The Report also raised the spectre that if countries were
97. A nation may, however, protest process-based product restrictions as extraterritorial
regulation of its citizens' actions by another nation.
98. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 82.
99. 1 am grateful to my former student, Jeffrey Dunoff, now Assistant Professor of
Law at Temple University School of Law, for this insight.
100. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 82.
101. Id. paras. 5.24-.34, at 1619-21.
102. GATT SECRETARIAT, supra note 70, at 6.
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free to impose unilateral restrictions on trade in the name of process-related
environmental concerns, the world would "risk an eventual descent into
chaotic trade conditions similar to those that plagued the 1930s."103
As noted, this position has considerable force where the environmental
harm done by the process is internal to the nation where it occurs. Quite
different considerations apply to exploitation of the commons. 104 The U.S.
tuna ban was nonetheless suspect under a proportionality test. No showing
was made that the porpoise species in the area were endangered or had
fallen below sustainable levels, or that they were in greater danger than
porpoise in other areas, fished intensively by U.S. boats, where the regu-
lation did not apply. Nor was there evidence that the incidental take quota
established by U.S. law had any rational relation to resource preservation.
Moreover, the incidental take rate for non-U.S. boats was a regulatory
''moving target," constantly adjusted in relation to the performance of the
U.S. fleet, making compliance by non-U.S. boats more difficult. Although
the U.S. fleet was subject to a somewhat more stringent incidental take
restriction, the regulation applied to an area of the Pacific where there were
only a few U.S. boats and far more Mexican ones. 05 Given these facts, the
panel could reasonably have concluded-that the protectionist aspects of the
measure and its limited environmental justification were sufficient to con-
demn it under the standard traditionally applied in product regulatory
disputes in federal-type systems such as the United States or the European
Community.106
This test would also rule out a ban on imports from a given nation of
one product (such as Japanese pearls) because of opposition to the envi-
ronmental consequences of harvesting entirely unrelated resources (such as
hawksbill sea turtles). The threatened U.S. ban on imports of Japanese
products was aimed, not at the harvesting of turtles by, Japan, but at
Japan's import of turtle products from others. It was thus the environmental
equivalent of a secondary boycott. The threat, and resultant publicity,
helped lead the Japanese to agree to phase out such imports. But these
occasional instances of success in the tactical use of product boycotts does
not show that they are a sound general response to issues of trade and
environment.
Process-Based Pollution Spillovers-Still different considerations are
raised by import product bans aimed at the pollution generated by the
103. Id. at 20.
104. While some of the fish caught may have been processed in Mexico, the environmental
effects of concern occurred on the high seas. In other instances the fish were processed in
third countries; imports to the United States from these countries were also banned.
105. This circumstance may, however, reflect the fact that the U.S. fleet had already been
subjected to incidental take restrictions.
106. The panel decision has not, however, been appealed to the GATT Council, and
Mexico is taking steps to comply with the U.S. law. It is doing so in order to allay concerns
of U.S. environmentalists and thereby enhance the likelihood that the United States will ratify
the NAFTA.
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processes of their production, where such pollution causes or threatens
significant environmental harm in the importing state. 0 7 Examples might
include regional ozone transport or acid deposition, depletion of strato-
spheric ozone through CFC and halon emissions, 08 and global climate
change resulting from GHG emissions. In this instance a product ban could
be understood as a form of self-help against deliberate injury. Alternatively,
the injured importing state might impose a tariff based on the additional
production costs that the exporting state would have to incur in order to
prevent the injury, although as a practical matter this would be very difficult
to determine. Given the lack of other remedies available under international
law, such forms of self-help do not seem objectionable in principle, but
there are very significant problems in ensuring that such measures are
justified by the end asserted-prevention of serious environmental injury-
and not exercised in a protectionist or otherwise arbitrary fashion. These
problems raise questions such as how serious is the pollution spillover?
Would the restriction be effective in preventing it? Are the preventive
requirements that it would impose on the polluting country reasonable,
judged in light of the importing nation's practices and those of other
nations? What competitive advantage would a ban or tariff give to domestic
manufacturers? Is there evidence that the measure is aimed at economic
rather than pollution spillovers? Is the environmental benefit to the im-
porting nation reasonably proportionate to the trade detriments imposed?
It would not appear beyond the competence of a specialized tribunal to
work out a satisfactory resolution of these matters. In addition, there is the
problem of distinguishing transboundary physical spillovers from those that
are merely local. Many environmentalists believe that everything is connected
to everything else, but in a regime of sovereign states, distinctions of degree,
if not of kind, must be recognized. The standards for upholding product
import restrictions assertedly aimed at pollution spillovers should be rea-
sonably demanding in order to rule out the dangers of arbitrary or protec-
tionist actions, and might only be met in the case of regional pollution
spillovers causing serious current injury.
One may object that the foregoing analysis, framed as it is in terms of
externalities, entirely misses the possibility that trade restrictions might be
based on moral principles. The citizens of B may object in principle to the
107. Product import restrictions based on the environmental effects of the processes used
to make such products must be distinguished from regulations that require inspection of
manufacturing processes to ensure that the product made is safe. It is, for example, common
for a nation, A, importing food or drugs from another nation, B, to insist on inspecting B's
manufacturing plants or on B showing satisfactory evidence of the use of good manufacturing
practices. In many instances it is very difficult to assess the safety of each product, and far
more convenient to ensure that the manufacturing process has sufficient quality assurances.
Pep Fuller, Remarks at the Washington & Lee University Symposium on Trade and the
Environment (Sept. 25, 1992).
108. Stratospheric ozone depletion, however, is a mixed case because a large proportion
of emissions comes from products incorporating CFCs.
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adverse environmental effects resulting from A's production of product X
and do not wish to participate in such environmental degradation by
consuming X. Such a view is sincerely held by many people. It may, for
example, explain the U.S. tuna/dolphin regulations. But, for reasons ex-
plained at the outset, this conception is not an appropriate basis for resolving
international trade and environmental issues. If accepted, it would be a wild
card impervious to assessments of efficacy and proportionality. If admitted
as a justification for trade restrictions, almost any unilateral restraint on
trade could be justified. People may sincerely have an aversion to eating
beef from cattle that have ingested BGH, or to food produced by bioen-
gineered organisms, even though there is no scientific evidence indicating,
that such products carry any special risk. This is not to say that moral
principles can not play a legitimate role in the generous conception of
human welfare that should underlay environmental and trade policy. But
such an untethered assertion of moral justification does not command
unblinking deference. At the very least, as developed further below, it
should be reflected in an agreement by a substantial number of nations.
Trade restrictions imposed pursuant to an international agreement may
present quite different issues than restrictions imposed unilaterally by a
single nation.'09
B. Multilateral Restrictions
An agreement among a group of some but not all nations establishes
certain common environmental standards and practices for product risks
and labels, natural resource management, waste management, or production
processes. Trade sanctions are imposed against nonsignatories who fail to
observe such standards. Such sanctions may or may not be explicitly
authorized by the agreement. These circumstances should not automatically
validate a trade restriction that would be invalid if imposed unilaterally. At
the same time, they alter the framework for analysis and, potentially, its
result.
In a federal-type system such group agreements rarely occur. If a
substantial number of states want common measures to deal with an
environmental problem, that interest is likely to be shared to some extent
by those in other states because of basic similarities among states that are
109. A more difficult problem is presented by unilateral labelling requirements assertedly
designed to inform consumers in the importing state of the environmental consequences of the
product's production. In principle, there is nothing objectionable about such labelling, which
should enhance consumer welfare. In practice, however, it is often extraordinarily difficult to
provide such information in an accurate, concise, and nonmisleading fashion. Heavy-handed
labelling requirements may lead consumers to boycott products that they would not boycott
if they had complete information. The GATT panel that struck down the U.S. ban on imports
of tuna based on incidental take of tuna nonetheless upheld a U.S. labelling requirement based
on the concept of "dolphin-safe" tuna. Suppose the European Community required all imports
of U.S. beef from cattle that had received BGH to be labelled: "Notice: This beef product is
from cattle that were given chemicals to increase their weight"?
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members of the same federal-type system. Accordingly, it will often be
possible to enact common legislation to deal with the problem. There will,
however, be regional conflicts of interest that will shape the compromises
made in such legislation and may at times block legislation altogether, as
was the case for a dozen years with legislation to deal with acid precipitation
in the United States and is still the case with energy policies in the European
Community. But in such situations the states desiring controls have appar-
ently never considered the possibility of making a separate agreement and
imposing restrictions or duties on product imports from nonsignatory states.
The United States Constitution would require Congress to approve any such
agreement as an interstate compact. In the Low Level Radioactive Waste
Act, Congress sought to encourage the formation of regional compacts for
establishment of a common waste disposal facility for the states parties to
the compact." 0 Congress did so by authorizing the signatory states to exclude
wastes from nonsignatories.' 1 '
In analyzing the validity in the international context of trade restrictions
imposed pursuant to an agreement among some nations, one must again
distinguish the different types of externalities that might be addressed by
such measures. There is a strong common interest in harmonizing product
regulatory standards, even in the midst of debate about what those standards
should be, because different product regulatory standards reduce the welfare
of all producers and consumers in the FTR. Work is proceeding under the
auspices of GATT, OECD, and other international organizations to har-
monize regulatory and labelling standards for chemicals. It would be more
difficult to harmonize standards for other products, such as pesticides,
automobiles, and biotechnology, because of differences -among nations in
the stage of economic development, assimilative capacity, and social attitudes
toward risk. Environmentalists in nations with stringent product regulations
'fear that harmonization will mean a weakening of their standards. Uncer-
tainties in risk analysis and differences in approaches to risk management
also impede harmonization. Even when a group standard is agreed upon,
it should not automatically be validated if its justification is challenged,
and circumstances may exist where the nature and effect of the common
standard and the identity of the group gives ground for suspicion of an
attempt to exercise market power for competitive ends. But group standards
should, ceteris paribus, enjoy greater deference than unilateral ones, and
the deference should be greater if more rather than fewer nations have
agreed to the common standard.
Agreements among nations to prohibit exports of environmentally risky
products should also enjoy greater deference than unilateral measures. One
110. See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1988)).
111. The Supreme Court, however, recently invalidated a key provision of the legislation,
requiring states to take title to privately-generated wastes in order to induce them to develop
adequate disposal capacity, concluding that the provision violated the Tenth Amendment. New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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reason why nations are reluctant to impose such restrictions is a fear that
they will not protect. the environment but simply benefit competitors in
other nations who do not adopt such, measures. Deference to common
measures would help promote agreements that would ameliorate the problem
of competitive disadvantage. And, while differences in nations' environments
and their stage of development means that environmental standards should
not necessarily be uniform, wide agreement by exporting nations on an
export ban is unlikely to be reached, given competitive pressures, unless the
product in question is unduly dangerous in nearly all contexts.
Common restrictions on natural resource exports may well constitute a
mere cartel. Consider, for example, an OPEC restriction on output in the
name of resource conservation. Such measures should enjoy even less
deference than a unilateral ban, unless accompanied by significant common
efforts at resource preservation and management. The participation of
importing states in such agreements would help to show that environmental
protection justifies the restrictions.
On the other hand, regional compacts for waste handling that exclude
imports from nonsignatories should enjoy a sympathetic assessment. As
already noted, considerations both of economics and ecology make regional
solutions more desirable than a regime that requires each nation to dispose
of all of its wastes internally. Experience with low-level radioactive waste
in the United States suggests that the ability to exclude waste imports from
nonparticipants in a regional plan for joint disposal arrangements is a
critical incentive for the formation of joint waste management regimes. The
Basel Convention follows a less ambitious approach, requiring signatories
to exclude wastes from nations that do not adhere to the Convention's
provisions for informed importing state consent and exporting state respon-
sibility for environmentally sound disposal."1
2
The validity of an agreement by some nations to impose harmonized
controls on production processes and to exclude products produced by
nonsignatories that decline to adopt those controls should again depend on
the type of externality in question. If the resulting environmental degradation
is confined to the nonsignatory's territory, the exclusion should not generally
be valid. Nations that have agreed to common process controls may well
suffer a competitive disadvantage relative to those that have not agreed.
Nonetheless, trade restrictions designed to eradicate comparative advantages
stemming from differences in social and regulatory policies are inconsistent
with the logic of the FTR and principles of national sovereignty. The fact
that some nations agreeing to common controls have pooled their purchasing
power to induce nonsignatories to adopt those same controls in no way
alters this conclusion. Exclusions assertedly justified by the host nation's
failure to manage its resources wisely, with resulting impairment of use and
nonuse values for citizens of other nations, are too prone to arbitrary
application and intrude too deeply on national sovereignty to be justified,
112. Basel Convention, supra note 59, art. 4, at 661-63.
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especially given that there are carrots-in the form of various types of
assistance and market-based incentives for resource preservation-that are
a more appropriate and likely more effective means of satisfying transna-
tional interests in resource preservation."'
International practice shows that trade in endangered species stands on
a different footing than ordinary products or natural resources. For one
thing, it is more difficult to distinguish product and process in the case of
endangered species" The taking of a specimen creates an adverse environ-
mental effect-diminution of an already endangered population-but the
dead specimen itself embodies the adverse effect. Also, there is rarely any
competitive or protectionist advantage that the nations imposing such a ban
can achieve. Bans on trade in endangered species represent an attempt to
impose the signatories' view of sound resource management on other nations.
But if the signatories are sufficiently numerous and diverse, that is evidence
that their view is not arbitrary. Trade bans such as the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) can be understood as
based both on deontological principle-refusing to participate in species
eradication-and the pragmatic ground of inducing changes in other nations'
resource management practices so as to prevent such destruction. The
premise that trade bans will promote conservation is sharply challenged by
those who believe that sophisticated systems of property rights and related
market incentives would be more effective in protecting endangered species.
If it proves true that market-based property rights systems are more effective
in protecting endangered species, reconsideration of trade bans would be in
order.' '4 Would participation in such a market offend moral principles if
the chances of species survival were thereby increased?
Multilateral restrictions on trade in products thats means of production
destroy the resources of the oceans, Antarctica, and other commons invite
special deference. As previously agreed, even unilateral measures designed
to promote wise commons management deserve respect. A fortiori, agree-
ments among nations to the same end deserve deference. The identity of
the signatories is relevant. Switzerland, unlike Japan, has no direct interest
in whaling. But surely signatory nations may jointly agree to abstain from
consumption of resources taken in violation of a joint regime to preserve
commons resources, if they reap no disproportionate competitive advantage
in doing so. The restriction is justified in part by a direct environmental
goal-restricting consumption that would fuel destruction of common re-
sources. And the restriction serves the related goal of reducing the compet-
itive disadvantage imposed on industry in the signatory states. The more
difficult question is the validity of a secondary boycott imposed on func-
113. A condition of such assistance might be that the host nation agree to prohibitions
on exports of resources produced in violation of sound management practices and to corre-
sponding import prohibitions by the donor nations.
114. See Birds and Bees; Governments are Trying to Use Treaties to Prevent Extinction,
EcoNOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 15.
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tionally unrelated products-for example, a ban on Icelandic-produced fish
if Iceland disregards the whaling convention."'
Pollution spillovers present another case for group boycotts of imports
produced by processes that are not controlled in accordance with agreements
enjoying a more or less wide international consensus. Such measures, if
appropriately framed, not only protect common atmospheric or water
resources and prevent competitive disadvantages that would otherwise be
suffered by those that refrain from abuse of the commons, but are also a
form of self-help against infliction of harm. The broader the international
consensus on appropriate controls, the less the danger that they are being
deployed for protectionist or other arbitrary ends. Some environmentalists,
again believing literally that everything on earth is connected to everything
else, would seek to justify all process-based boycotts as preventing spillovers.
But, as in U.S. cases in which environmental regulation is challenged as a
"taking" of property, as opposed to nuisance-based restrictions designed to
prevent adverse impacts on third parties, a line must be drawn between
significant physical spillovers and those that are physically insubstantial or
based on nonuse values."
6
The Montreal Protocol exemplifies the use of trade restrictions against
nonsignatories to agreements regulating production processes in order to
prevent significant pollution spillovers that would both injure the commons
and the health and welfare of the signatory nations' inhabitants.' ' Such
restrictions deny markets that would fuel such spillovers," 8 and discourage
nonsignatories from free-riding on the efforts of the signatories. The broader
the ambit of such spillovers and the greater the number and the more
diverse the signatory nations, the greater the deference such agreements
should command. There nonetheless remains room for inquiry into the
extent of environmental justification for the restrictions. There would be
other ways of limiting consumption in the participating nations-such as
auctioning a limited quota of sale rights-without excluding products from
nonsignatory nations. To this extent, the exclusion can be viewed as a
protectionist measure aimed at economic spillovers and competitive advan-
tage. On the other hand, the exclusion can be viewed as an appropriate
response to those seeking to free ride on the signatories' joint effort.
Whether they are indeed free-riding, however, depends on what their ap-
propriate responsibility for responding to a common problem should be.
The mere fact that another nation has not adopted the standards or practices
115. Also, as the Law of the Sea negotiations reflect, sharp differences may exist among
nations as to what form of regulation or property rights should govern the commons.
116. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990).
117. Montreal Protocol, supra note 60.
118. Where agricultural or other use of exported products, such as chemical pesticides,
in other nations threatens the health or environment of nations that export such chemicals but
also import agricultural or other products produced by the use elsewhere of such chemicals
(the so-called "circle of poison"), the justifications for multilateral agreements to ban exports
of such products is similar.
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agreed to by a certain group of nations does not by itself establish free-
riding. Measures to restrict GHGs to deal with the threat of global warming
provide a difficult case in point.
Suppose that the European Community, in the name of combatting
global warming, agrees to curtail fossil-fuel carbon dioxide (C02) emissions
from production processes and adopts (a) a ban on imports of products
produced by processes with C02 emissions greater than that permitted by
EC standards, or (b) a tariff on imports of such products in an amount
assertedly equal to the cost differential advantage enjoyed by the noncom-
plying producers. The United' States protests that the threat of global
warming is speculative; that the focus on C02 alone, rather than all GHG
sources and sinks, is arbitrary from an ecological and economic perspective,
and that the measure is designed to impose, through joint trade restrictions,
competitive disadvantage on the United States, which has relatively more
abundant fossil fuels, vaster distances across which people and goods must
be transported, and climates that are both colder and hotter than those
generally experienced in the EC. The EC rejoins that global warming is
likely to occur, with potentially serious adverse effects, unless GHG emis-
sions are substantially reduced, and that fossil-fuel C02 is by far the most
significant GHG and the one that can be most reliably controlled.
A transnational dispute resolution authority responsible for determining
whether an EC trade ban against products from fossil fuel C02 sources
was compatible with global welfare in the context of an environmentally
responsive FTR would have to evaluate the scientific evidence regarding the
extent of global climate change in the absence of controls, the adverse
effects should it occur, the practical justifications for controls limited to
C02 emissions from fossil fuels, rather than all GHGs, their sources and
sinks, and the extent to which such restrictions could be explained as a
trade boycott aimed at securing competitive advantage. The relevant au-
thority would also be required to evaluate whether less restrictive alterna-
tives, such as a comprehensive approach aimed at all GHGs, sources, and
sinks, would sufficiently promote the asserted objective. If a tariff were
adopted, the authority would have to enquire whether the level at which it
was set was arbitrary.
In the tuna/dolphin case, the GATT Panel interpreted the GATT as
imposing a flat ban on process-based product restrictions. This reading was
not required by the text of the GATT." 9 Nor was it justified by a "slippery
119. Article XX(b) provides an exception from the GATT's general prohibitions against
export restrictions for measures "necessary to protect human, animal or'plant life or health,"
and Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption." GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(b), 61 Stat. at A61,
55 U.N.T.S. at 262. Neither provision resolves the question of whether or not the measures
excepted include those aimed at imported products created by processes that harm the
environment. Nor does Article III, which prohibits the application of national regulations to
imported or domestic products for the purpose of protecting domestic production, resolve this
issue.
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slope" fear that to allow any process-based restrictions of product trade
would open the floodgates to intolerable abuse. Tribunals in federal-type
systems have proved capable of judging contextually the justifications for
regulatory restrictions on trade without invoking such rigid categorical
distinctions. True, they have not had to face process-based restrictions,
which pose more imponderables than product-based restrictions, in large
part because uniform federal-type regulation of processes is far more readily
available than it is in the international context. Moreover, GATT or other
international tribunals are far less institutionally secure and must be more
respectful of state sovereignty. These considerations counsel a heavy but
not insurmountable burden of justification for multilateral trade restrictions
designed to enforce process controls on nonsignatories whose processes
generate significant harmful pollution spillovers.
As previously noted, the GATT is not a well-established, highly respected
tribunal like the Supreme Court or the Court of Justice. In its current
situation, it may not have the institutional capacity to win assent to all of
the principles developed above. Also, the number of disputes brought to
GATT tribunals has been too small to develop sufficient precedent suffi-
ciently quickly to guide the fast-moving trade and environment field. The
Council appeal process further muddies the precedential weight of GATT
decisions. On the other hand, a growing number of international agreements
focus on trade-for example the Basel Convention. 20 Other agreements,
such as the Montreal Protocol, authorize trade sanctions. 2' The number of
environmentally related disputes brought before GATT and other tribunals
created by regional free trade agreements will likely increase. But the
international legislative and adjudicative process is inevitably rather slow,
cumbersome, and ad hoc. An institutional transition to a more integrated
system is ihecessary, but will necessarily proceed deliberately and experimen-
tally. For reasons noted previously, resolution of environmentally-related
trade disputes should remain with GATT tribunals or tribunals established
by regional agreements such as the FTA or NAFTA.122 But other means of
harmonizing trade and environmental regulation are needed. GATT can
participate in this process, as it has through the effort to develop common
sanitary and phytosanitary standards and through the GATT working party
on domestically prohibited goods. Industry, particularly in the United States,
has been suspicious of proposals for "greening" GATT.123 But the growing
concern for relative competitive advantage, and the fact that U.S. industry
operates under the world's most burdensome environmental regulatory sys-
tem, may make industry more willing to consider using the trade regime to
harmonize environmental regulatory standards. UNEP, UNCED, OECD,
120. See Basel Convention, supra note 59.
121. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 60.
122. See FTA, supra note 51; North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., available in LEXIS, GENFED-EXTRA Database; WL, NAFTA Database
(awaiting ratification as this article went to press).
123. Bruce Stokes, Greens Talk Trade, 23 NAT'L J. 862 (1991).
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and other IGOs must also be involved. As harmonization proceeds, one of
the most difficult problems will be dealing with insistence by some nations,
such as the United States, either that harmonized standards are no less
stringent than their domestic standards, or that they retain the freedom to
impose more restrictive standards and enforce those restrictions through
trade sanctions. Moreover, nations with strong environmental regulatory
programs may seek to justify unilateral imposition of environmentally-
related trade restrictions as a necessary means of prodding other nations to
agree to adequate multilateral standards.
C. Market-Based Regulatory Instruments
Thus far the analysis has focused on the use of command and control
regulations or tariffs to prevent environmental degradation. There are,
however, incentives other than regulatory restrictions enforced by trade
barriers or tariffs that can be used to deal with environmental externalities.
Bilateral or multilateral governmental grants of aid and technology transfers,
like those contemplated by the Agenda 21 principles adopted in Rio, 24 can
be used to promote pollution prevention and wiser resource management
by LDCs. Reliance on such tools alone, however, will not be sufficient,
even if they are conditioned on adoption by donee nations of environmen-
tally protective regulations together with suitable provisions for monitoring,
enforcement, NGO participation, and ongoing scientific review .
25
At least in the case of activities that destroy commons resources or
cause significant pollution spillovers, moral and pragmatic objections exist
to using payments as a general inducement for nations to restrain from
environmentally destructive practices. 2 6 The Montreal Protocol, however,
provides for financial assistance from the developed nations to the LDCs
to cover the costs of changing production processes to accommodate CFC
substitutes.27 This arrangement was vital in securing the assent of LDCs to
the protocol. The fact that both CFCs and their substitutes were developed
and marketed by developed country firms provides a potential distinction
to limit the precedental effect of this arrangement. The Agenda 21 principles
and the creation of a Global Environmental Facility within the World Bank
reveal an increased willingness on the part of the developed countries to
provide assistance to LDCs in order to promote environmentally sound
development. Nonetheless, the extent of the transfers which developed
countries will make are likely to be relatively small in relation to the
magnitude of potential environmental protection in the LDCs. The total
124. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 814 (discussing contents and impact of Agenda 21).
125. Enforcement mechanisms might include donor nation restrictions on trade in products
produced in violation of such restrictions.
126. See Karl Gbran Miler, International Environmental Problems, 6 OxFoRD REv. ECON.
PoL'Y 80 (1991).
127. Montreal Protocol, supra note 60, at 1555-56.
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amount of assistance being provided under the Montreal Protocol is 220
million dollars.' 28 The amounts required to finance significant restrictions
on GHG emissions from developing countries in the next several decades
would run to thousands of billions. Practical political factors would preclude
direct transfers from the developed countries of anywhere near such amounts.
The inherent drawbacks of using trade restrictions to induce process
regulation by other nations and the limitations of direct monetary transfers
make it appropriate to consider using market-based incentive systems that
would more effectively harmonize trade and environmental objectives. One
option is to impose taxes or charges on pollution or other forms of
environmental degradation. The European Community, for example, is
considering adoption of a significant tax on fossil fuels in order to curtail
GHG emissions. 29 Nations that jointly agreed to impose such charges on
domestic processes or products could seek to impose equivalent levies on
imported products. As already noted, such levies standing alone, even if
agreed to by a group of nations, would require scrutiny in order to prevent
strategic efforts to secure competitive advantage in the name of the envi-
ronment. But the burden of justification should be eased if signatory nations
agreed to set aside all or a part of the revenues for assistance to LDCs that
agreed to work toward reduction of the pollution in question. As .noted,
determining the appropriate countervailing duty on imported products made
by processes that are not subject to equivalent pollution or taxes is an
inherently somewhat arbitrary exercise. But, the danger of arbitrariness is
reduced when the duties are fixed through a process of broad consensus.
A further advantage of pollution or risk taxes or fees is that they will, in
most cases, achieve a given level of environmental protection at substantially
lower cost than command and control regulation because they allow different
sources and nations flexibility to achieve greater or lesser levels of control
based on their control costs.3 0 By lowering the cost of achieving environ-
mental protection, they make it easier for nations to agree to more protective
environmental standards. They also provide strong incentives for technolog-
ical innovation; firms that can find new, cost-effective ways to provide
goods and services with less pollution will pay less in taxes and enjoy a
competitive advantage. By harnessing the power of the market in the service
of ecological protection, they harmonize the trade and environmental goals
at both a practical and a conceptual level. -
Several drawbacks exist to the use of fees or taxes to reduce pollution
from industrial and commercial processes. In the case of some environmental
problems, such as global warming, quite high fees or taxes would be needed
128. See International Ozone Conference Opens, XINHoU GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, June
26, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
129. See Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions
and Energy, 25 BULL. EUR. Commia. 46-47 (No. 5, 1992).
130. For an overview of the potential role of economic incentives in promoting environ-
mental protection, see Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 153 (1988).
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in order to induce significant limitations on net GHG emissions. There is
often strong political opposition to such taxes, especially from industry.
While compliance costs would in most cases be appreciably lower under a
system of fees or taxes than under command and control regulation, total
industry outlays would often be greater because industry would have to pay
a fee or tax on the pollution remaining after reductions were made; under
command and control regulation, such residual pollution is "free." The
very large revenues created by regulatory-oriented fees or taxes would also
create problems under a system that earmarked some or all of the proceeds
for assistance to LDCs. The prospect of massive international transfers
would increase domestic political opposition to taxes. The developed coun-
tries would be reluctant to entrust international institutions with authority
over such vast revenues. IGO bureaucracies would not be well equipped to
ensure that transfers on such a scale would be wisely and effectively spent.
A fee system would also require accurate monitoring of emissions.
Accuracy may be particularly difficult to achieve in the case of some
pollutants, such as the GHG methane. Professional and administrative
capabilities in many nations are primitive. Proxy measures for actual emis-
sions could, however, be developed. Moreover, the development of accurate
monitoring capabilities, data disclosure practices, and other methods of
compliance verification is essential to secure implementation of environ-
mental agreements regardless of whether command and control or market-
type instruments are used.
An alternative market-based approach for dealing with environmental
degradation is transferrable pollution or resource use permits. The United
States has successfully used this approach to reduce lead in gasoline, and
is implementing an ambitious system of tradeable pollution deduction credits
to reduce sulfur air emissions by fifty percent.' 3' In the international context,
a tradeable permit system might be used to limit GHG emissions.3 2 Partic-
ipating nations would agree to restrict net emissions of GHGs from their
territory according to an agreed-upon schedule. Such an agreement would
in effect establish a net GHG emissions allowance for each participating
nation. Nations that did not need to use their entire allotment could sell
their excess allowances to others. Such sales could either be made between
nations, or between private firms in different nations that had been allocated
allowances by their respective nations."' Transferrable permits have the
same desirable cost-reducing and innovation-enhancing properties as taxes
or fees. Firms that are successful in developing less-polluting ways of doing
131. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 §§ 401-416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (Supp.
I 1990).
132. See Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to
Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83
(1992).
133. The Montreal Protocol allows trading of CFC allowances in connection with industrial
rationalization. The Global Climate convention allows signatories to adopt joint measures for
dealing with GHCs. This could include international trading systems.
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business can make money by doing so, and sell their excess allowances to
other firms for whom it is more difficult and costly to reduce emissions.
In addition, one can blunt industry opposition to controls by giving allow-
ances to industry rather than auctioning them off, thus maintaining the
"free" status of residual emissions.
In order to win their assent to limitations, LDCs would probably be
given relatively more allowances than developed nations. This would rep-
resent a transfer of valuable in-kind assets to the LDCs, but in a form less
likely to excite domestic political opposition than would outright cash grants.
International market transfers of such allowances would be a very effective
way of transferring capital and appropriate technology to LDCs. For
example, firms in developed countries would provide capital and know-
how, including technology protected by intellectual property rights, to
foreign nations or firms to enable them to provide goods or services in a
more energy-efficient fashion. The firms in the developed countries would
be compensated for these investments in part by transfers from the LDCs
of net GHG emission allowances that are not needed because of the energy
savings obtained as a result of the investment. The developed country firms
could use such allowances themselves, or, more likely, sell them to other
firms anywhere in the world. The development of an international "green"
currency, in the form of GHG allowances, would help channel resources to
take advantage of the most cost-effective opportunities for GHG worldwide.
This decentralized, market-based system could be supplemented by bilateral
or multilateral governmental grants, but it would likely be far more effective
in ensuring appropriate, cost-effective technology transfer than exclusive
reliance on international bureaucracies. For this reason, a system of trans-
ferrable allowances would be even more effective than taxes or fees in
harmonizing the FTR and environmental protection. It would make envi-
ronmentalists of Adam Smith and David Ricardo.
CONCLUSION
The economy is global. Many of the various environmental externalities
generated by economic activity are also global in scope. Even when pollution
is local, measures to deal with it can generate worldwide competitiveness
externalities. Devising effective responses to these externalities is a major
political and institutional challenge. The experience in federal-type systems
underscores the importance of reconciling environmental protection measures
with the FTR upon which economic welfare so heavily depends. The federal-
type experience suggests the need for some form of international tribunal
to assess the validity of trade-restrictive measures assertedly justified on
environmental protection grounds, as well as legislation by international
agreement. Such legislation may, in appropriate circumstances, impose res-
trictions on trade in order to promote common efforts at environmental
protection. In many cases, however, the interests in environmental protection
and free trade will be more effectively promoted through increased inter-
national use of market-based incentives rather than command regulation.
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